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I. Introduction
Several times a year, a law review publishes an analysis of the
jurisdictional boundaries separating federal, state and tribal govern-
ments.' Studies of federal Indian law2 and the application of general
laws to Native Americans3 are just as prevalent. Conversely, very few
authors focus on Indian law: Native American dispute resolution
techniques and substantive laws.4
1. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WnuAMTT
L. Ra,. 84.1 (1990); Frank Pommersheim, Tribal-State Relations: Hope for the Future?
36 S.D. L. Ra,. 239 (1991); Frank Pommersheim, The Crucible of Sovereignty: Analyzing
Issues of Tribal Jurisdiction, 31 Aiz. L. Ray. 329 (1989). Many recent articles criticize
the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990),
denying tribes criminal jurisdiction over Indians who are not members of that tribe. See,
e.g., Philip S. Deloria & Nell J. Newton, The Criminal Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts over
Non-Member Indians: An Examination of the Basic Framework of Inherent Tribal Sov-
ereignty Before and After Duro v. Reina, 38 FED. BAR NEws & J. 70 (1991); Peter Fabish,
Comment, The Decline of Tribal Sovereignty: The Journey from Dicta to Dogma in Duro
v. Reina, 66 WASH. L. REV. 567 (1991). The Duro decision, and the reaction of the
Navajo judiciary to it, is discussed below. See infra notes 252-59 and accompanying text.
2. "Federal Indian law" refers to federal statutory and case law dealing primarily
or exclusively with Native Americans. Volume 25 of the United States Code contains the
statutory law. Recent articles dealing with federal Indian law include Philip P. Frickey,
Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian
Law, 78 CAL. L. Ray. 1137 (1990); Thomas H. Pacheco, Indian Bedlands Claims: A
Need to Clear the Waters, 15 HARv. ENm. L. Rav. 1 (1991); Rachael P. Paschel,
Comment, The Imprimatur of Recognition: American Indian Tribes and the Federal
Acknowledgement Process, 66 WAsH. L. Rav. 209 (1991).
3. For example, many articles published during the past few years take issue with
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), that the free exercise clause does not require a
state to exempt the sacramental use of peyote by members of the Native American Church
from its prohibition against the use or possession of controlled substances. See Robert N.
Clinton, Peyote and Judicial Activism: Neo-Colonialism and the Supreme Court's New
Indian Law Agenda, 38 FED. B. NEws & J. 92 (1991); Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Hallucinations
of Neutrality in the Oregon Peyote Case, 16 AM. IN~rDuN L. RE. 1 (1991); Sara Juster,
Comment, Free Exercise - Or the Lack Thereof? Employment Division v. Smith, 24
CP.mGHToN :L. REv. 239 (1990). But see William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and
Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. Cm. L. RaV. 308 (1991) (acknowledging questionable
use of prior precedents, but defending theory underlying decision).
4. Mosit of the published materials focus primarily on procedural issues, using that
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No. 1] NA VAJO DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Scholars' apparent lack of interest is surprising. Indian law signif-
icantly affects the lives of many Americans, both natives5 and others.
Moreover, study of the development and role of law among Native
American tribes can provide valuable information to scholars interested
in the role of law in "third world" societies. 6
term broadly to encompass issues such as the structure of the tribal courts and the training
and performance of tribal court judges and advocates. Of these, the two most compre-
hensive are SAMuEr J. BR, xAx., AmmucN INDiAN TgiB CouRTs: Tam CosTs OF S'ARATE
JusncE (1978) (criticizing the quality of native judicial systems, and recommending that
those systems be disbanded in favor of state and federal court adjudications) and NATIONAL
AimucAN INDiAN CoURT JuDGEs Ass'N LONG RANGE PLAnNING PRO3ECT, INDiAN CouRTs
A TE FuruRE (1978) (suggesting improvements to native justice systems). Several articles
have focused specifically on the Navajo justice system. See Chief Justice Tom Tso, The
Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 31 Aiz. L. REv. 225 (1989) [hereinafter
Tso, Decision Making in Tribal Courts]; Tso, The Tribal Court Survives in America,
JuDGEs' J., Spring 1986, at 22 [hereinafter Tso, The Tibal Court Survives]; James W.
Zion, The Navajo Peacemaker Court: Deference to the Old and Accommodation to the
New, 11 Am. Ir'mi L. RPv. 89 (1983).
These texts contain little analysis of substantive law in the native courts. The few articles
that have considered substantive issues of civil law in the tribal courts focus primarily on
two issues: (1) judicial review of executive and legislative acts, including the waiver of
sovereign immunity, see Frank Pommersheim & Terry Pechota, Tribal Immunity, Tribal
Courts, and the Federal System: Emerging Contours and Frontiers, 31 S.D. L. Rav. 553
(1986) (advocating tribal use of methods of partial waiver of sovereign immunity that will
not endanger tribe's fiscal solvency); Alvin J. Ziontz, After Martinez: Civil Rights Under
Tribal Government, 12 U.C. DAvIs L. Ray. 1 (1979) (analyzing desirability of tribal judicial
review in light of United States Supreme Court's decision that federal courts generally
lack jurisdiction to resolve Indian Civil Rights Act disputes); Fredric Brandfon, Comment,
Tradition and Judicial Review in the American Indian Tribal Court System, 38 UCLA L.
Rav. 991 (1991) (stating that tribal courts should engage in judicial review based at least
in part on tribal traditions) [hereinafter Brandfon, Tradition & Judicial Review], and (2)
the use of tribal customs and traditions in the tribal courts, James W. Zion, Harmony
Among the People: Torts and Indian Courts, 45 MONT. L. Rav. 265 (1984) (focusing on
development of Indian common law in tort suits before Native American courts); Brandfon,
Tradition & Judicial Review, supra. None attempts to analyze a concrete body of sub-
stantive law'in the context of the particular conditions -historical, social, or otherwise
- in which it develops.
5. This article generally uses the term "Native Americans" to refer to peoples often
called "Indians." The phrase "Native Americans" admittedly is somewhat unsatisfactory
because the "natives" are not really native to the Americas. It is believed that they crossed
to Alaska from Siberia in several waves beginning at least 25,000 years ago. Neal Salisbury,
American Indians and American History, in THE AiimucN IN AN AND Tra PROBLEM OF
HISToRY 46, 47-48 (Calvin Martin ed., 1987) [hereinafter THE AMEmc~A INDiN]. The
term "Indians," however, is more misleading. It derives from Christopher Columbus'
erroneous belief that he had reached Asia, instead of a continent unknown to him. Robert
F. Berkhofer, Jr., Cultural Pluralism Versus Ethnocentrism in the New Indian History,
in Tan AmERicAN INDIAN, supra, at 35, 38.
6. Scholars of the role of law in third world societies have concentrated primarily
on Asian, African, and Latin American societies. See Carl A. Auerbach, The Relation of
Legal Systems to Social Change, 1980 Wis. L. Ray. 1227, 1227 n.2 (identifying about 60
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Native American courts7 and laws, however, vary from tribe to
tribe, posing an obstacle to study. The Navajo Nation' is a logical
place to start. It has more members subject to tribal laws and courts
than any other tribe; 9 the Navajos, or the dine'J (the word, generally
translated into English as "the people," that Navajos use to refer to
themselves), 0 have retained a strong tribal identity;" their judicial
articles and books concerning the role of the legal system in the modernization process;
except for the general studies, all, or virtually all, of the articles and books concern the
modernization process in Asian, African or Latin American countries).
7. In the 1970s, tribal courts existed on between 60 and 120 reservations, depending
on one's definition of "courts" and "reservations." BRr, supra note 4, at 5.
8. The Navajo Tribal Council has directed that the name "Navajo Nation" be used
by governmental officials to describe the lands and people of the Navajo Tribe. NAvAJo
TRm. CODE tit. 1 § 301(a) (1977). The self-reference as a "nation" is correct under federal
Indian law. Early in United States history, Chief Justice Marshall described tribes as
"domestic dependent nations," Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831),
and later explained that, under international law, a "weak state, in order to provide for
its safety, may place itself under the protection of one more powerful, without stripping
itself of the right of government, and ceasing to be a state." Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560-61 (1832).
9. A larger number of people claim to have Cherokee blood than Navajo. Census
data from 1980 show the three largest tribes, based on self-identification of respondents,
to be Cherokee (232,000), Navajo (159,000) and Sioux (79,000). U.S. DEP'T OF COMERCE,
Bu .Au OF nE CENsus, CENSUS BuREAU R AsEs REPORT OF AMeucAN INDiAN TamEs
at CB 90-22 (1990) [hereinafter CENsus BuREAU REPORT]. Most Cherokees do not live
near their reservations, however. Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) figures for 1989 show
that about 186,000 Navajos live on or sufficiently near the Navajo Reservation to fall
within the BIA's service population, while about 87,000 Cherokee live on or near their
Oklahoma agency and another 6000 live on or near the Eastern Cherokee Reservation in
North Carolina. BIA, INDiAN SvicE POPULATION AND LABOR FORCE EsTIMATES tbl. 3,
at 8, 13, 14 (1989) [hereinafter BIA REPORT]; see also NAvAro NATIoN Div. oF CommuNnm
D-v., CHATE rR IMAGES: 1989 (1990) [hereinafter NAVAiO NATION RPOORT] (estimating
Navajo population in 1989 at 219,000, with 169,000 on reservation, 25,000 near the
reservation and 25,000 elsewhere). The Navajo population represents almost 20% of the
949,000 Native Americans within the BIA's service population. BIA REPORT, supra, tbl.
1, at 1; id. tbl. 3, at 14. Only those living near their reservations are likely to be affected
by tribal law.
10. The word "Navajo" is Spanish in origin, and does not exist in the language of
the dine'd. CLYDE KLUCKHOHN & DOROTEA LmoiHroN, TAE NAVAHO xv (rev. ed. 1974).
11. Several years ago, two scholars noted:
One immediately apparent difference [from other Native Americans] was
that although Navajos and. Anglo-Americans have lived side-by-side in the
San Juan Valley for a hundred years, there has been little social mixing of
the populations. The boundaries separating the two communities were any-
thing but ambiguous. One was either a Navajo or an Anglo-American, and
only a few people of mixed ancestry were subject to confusions of allegiance.
Equally striking, all Navajos except children and an occasional young adult
spoke Navajo. We were also surprised to find that they showed little interest
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol18/iss1/2
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system is the most sophisticated, by Anglo standards, of any tribe's; 2
and they publish an official reporter and the tribal code, facilitating
research. 13
To analyze all fields of Navajo law in a single article would be
impossible. This article will focus on disputes concerning promises and
the institutions in which promissory disputes are resolved. Resolution
of promissory disputes involves those institutions, especially the Navajo
tribal courts, in critical policy determinations.
As the dine'i have assumed increasing control of their own affairs
from the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) 14 during the second half of
the twentieth century, their government has struggled to formulate
rules governing companies doing business with Navajos. The average
tribal member is very poor and unemployment on the reservation is
very high;' 5 therefore, the nation's leaders have sought to encourage
in or even curiosity about other tribes or Anglo-Americans.
GAIuCK A. BALEY & ROBERTA G. BAILEY, A HIsTORY OF TnE NAVAiOS: THE REsERVATION
YEsxS 5 (1986) [hereinafter BA=LE].
The dine'V also consider themselves distinct from other Native American groups:
By the 1950s many Native Americans were subordinating their tribal identity
to their identity as Indians. While acknowledging the cultural and historical
differences between tribes, they saw a commonality in their experience that
overrode what, by that time, had become superficial tribal distinctions. The
Navajos, on the other hand, did not think of themselves as members of the
larger Indian community. They considered their history to be unique and
their culture, unlike that of many tribes, to be very much alive.
Id. at 6.
12. See Michael Taylor, Modern Practice in the Indian Courts, 10 U. PuGEr SouN
L. REv. 231, 236 (1987) (stating that Navajo Nation has "flagship tribal judicial system,
pre-eminent because of its size"); Ziontz, supra note 4, at 18 ("The Navajos have what
is probably the most highly developed and sophisticated tribal judicial system among the
tribal governments in the United States").
13. Five volumes of the Navajo Reporter, containing appellate and selected district
court opinions from 1969 through 1987, have been published. The Navajo Community
College intends to soon publish volume 6, containing decisions from 1988 through 1990.
The 1977 edition of the Navajo Tribal Code and a 1984-85 cumulative pocket part also
have been published. Practitioners desperately need an updated version of the code.
Telephone Interview with Frank Lally, Attorney, Gallup, N.M. (July 9, 1991).
14. See FEL.X CoHmN's HANDBOOK OF FDERAL INuAN LAw 117-21 (Rennard Strick-
land et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN] (tracing evolution of federal government agencies
in charge of Indian affairs).
15. Census data for 1980 show unemployment among the Navajos, regardless of
location, at 52%, median family income of about $9,900, and 45% of Navajos living in
poverty. CENsus BuREAu R 'ORT, supra note 9. Tribal and BIA figures for Navajos living
within the BIA service area reflect approximately a 50% unemployment rate during 1988.
BIA REPORT, supra note 9, at 14; NAVAJO NATION REPORT, supra note 9, at 3. All
unemployment statistics in the Navajo Nation, however, are problematic, see NAvAjo
TmEs TODAY, July 25, 1985, at 1, col. 4, and some reports contain lower figures. See
Sandra Atchison, Bad Day at Window Rock, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 6, 1989, at 32 (estimating
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business development. 6 On the other hand, they also have tried to
guard against exploitative businesses and to preserve the dine'd's cul-
ture, which business development arguably might undermine. 7
The Navajo judiciary faces the same quandary. A businessperson
who perceives the nation's dispute resolution mechanisms and trans-
actional law favorably is more likely to operate on the reservation and
to deal with the tribe and individual Navajos. The dine'd, however,
have traditional means of resolving disputes, involving mediation by
respected community leaders, 8 and traditional customs concerning
promissory obligations. 19 To the extent that the courts follow Anglo-
American procedures and laws, they may undermine Navajo traditions;
to the extent that they reject Anglo-American procedures and laws,
they may exacerbate the already difficult economic conditions.
This dilemma is similar to that faced by third world countries seeking
to incorporate elements of the economic and cultural life of Western
societies. Part II of this article identifies various approaches to the
analysis of the role of law in this "development" process. No analytical
approach adequately explains the role of the legal system in the process,
but the available information does illuminate the challenges and choices
facing any particular "developing" society, including the Navajos.
Parts ]:11 and IV draw heavily on historical and anthropological
research on the Navajos. Part III focuses on traditional Navajo society
and dispute resolution, and part IV on the economic and political
changes that have occurred over the last 125 years. Primarily in the
period after World War II, the dine'd have transformed themselves
from a decentralized herding society to one with a powerful national
government in which wage-earning has become the central economic
40% unemployment rate); Joseph P. Shapiro, Up by the Bootstraps Is an Uphill Fight
for Indians, U.S. NEws & WoRLw RE,., Feb. 22, 1988, at 26 (estimating 35% unemploy-
ment rate).
16. See, e.g., Atchison, supra note 15, at 32 (stating that Peter MacDonald was
elected as Chairman in 1986 on promise to bring jobs to reservation, and then delivered);
William Raspberry, The Navajos Reach for the Dream, WASH. Posr, Oct. 31, 1987, at
A21 (interviewing Navajo Chairman Peter MacDonald); Business Development Next Tribal
Priority, Says Agency Director, NAvAJo Tnus TODAY, Oct. 3, 1985, at I, col. 4.
17. See Raspberry, supra note 16 (stating that "the very culture of the Navajo" is
at risk in enc:ouraging business development). One Anglo-American lawyer who lives off
the reservation but has a substantial practice in the Navajo courts said, "They want to
have it both ways: they want to have their cultural identity, but they want to have all the
advantages of the twentieth and now about to be the twenty-first century, and they want
economic development." Interview with Thomas Hynes, Attorney, in Farmington, N.M.
(May 13, 1991) [hereinafter Hynes Interview].
18. See ifra notes 62-78 and accompanying text (describing traditional dispute res-
olution).
19. See infra notes 80-103 and accompanying text (discussing traditional promissory
relationships).
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activity. Many traditional societies have experienced similar changes,
often with wrenching results. The dine'd, however, have made the
transition relatively smoothly, incorporating many facets of Anglo-
American culture while preserving a strong sense of tribal identity and
essential elements of their traditional culture.
Finally, parts V and VI discuss current Navajo dispute resolution
and promissory law. Traditional customs were suited to the needs of
the Navajos' rural communities, but not to many facets of the changing
postwar society. Exhibiting their ability to incorporate aspects of for-
eign culture selectively, the dine'V have created essentially two systems
of dispute resolution and two systems of promissory liability law. The
courts, invariably the repository of disputes in which at least one of
the parties is a non-Navajo, apply rules of contract, commercial, and
consumer law similar but not identical to those in state and federal
court. Meanwhile, disputes between two Navajos, including disputes
over broken promises, often still are mediated in a traditional, or
modified-traditional, manner. This dual system has strains, some of
which are discussed, but appears to be a prudent resolution of the
dilemma posed by the coexistence-of a strong traditional society and
pressures for development.
I. The Role of Law in. the Transformation of Traditional Societies
During the twentieth century, scholars from many disciplines have
studied the interaction between "Western" and "third world" coun-
tries and the processes by which many third world countries have
acquired some of the attributes of Western countries. Until the last
decade, these scholars could be categorized - very broadly - into
two groups.
The first advocated modernization theory. These authors tended to
divide the world into traditional, modernizing and modem societies,
with Western countries and their political and economic systems serving
as the models of modem societies. Under modernization theory, so-
cieties evolved from traditional through modernizing to modem. Sev-
eral of these scholars advised leaders of third world countries about
methods to facilitate the evolutionary process, while largely ignoring
the tremendous differences among traditional societies which might
undermine the efficacy of their prescriptions. The movement fell into
intellectual disrepute as the scholars' advice proved ineffective and
critics highlighted the ethnocentric nature of the theory.20
20. See K6M/ AN Kucska, MODERNIZATION AND LAw (TMSES AND THouGHTs) 12-14
(1987) (describing early modernization theory); Francis G. Snyder, Law and Development
in the Light of Dependency Theory, 14 LAw & Soc. Rnv. 723, 724-28 (1980) (criticizing
modernization theory). Despite the problems which modernization theory encountered in
Third World countries, many scholars and politicians are now advising Eastern European
countries concerning the conversion from communist to Western systems. The advice
probably has little, if any, greater chance of success than that given earlier to Third World
countries.
No. 1]
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A subset of scholars and lawyers focused on the role of law in the
modernization process. Law and development theorists believed that
modernization required modern, by which they meant Western, law.
The attacks on modernization theory as ethnocentric and ineffective
were equally valid with respect to law and development theory.2'
The other group, dependency theorists, consisted largely of Marxists.
In general, they believed that the imperialist activities of developed
countries made the underdeveloped countries dependent. 22 Although
seemingly escaping from the ethnocentrism of the modernizers, they
substituted a form of issuecentrism by emphasizing economics, and
specifically economic imperialism, over all other issues. This emphasis
led them to downplay the historical and cultural differences among
the underdeveloped countries.
Scholars recently have attempted to transcend the deficiencies of
both approaches. This article draws heavily on a recent book by a
Hungarian, Kdlmdn Kulcsr.23 His approach avoids the problems of
Western ethnocentrism and economic issuecentrism. He focuses on a
society's ability to adapt to "changing external and internal condi-
tions. '" Traditional societies resist change, while modern societies are
open to, and capable of, reform to meet changing conditions. 2 Mod-
ernizationL involves the transformation of a society from resistant to
change to coping with change.
Although many countries have tried to use law to hasten and
facilitate the modernization process, Kulcsdr concludes that most have
had only limited success. "[E]xtra-legal factors and processes," in-
cluding a society's economic, political and cultural conditions, provide
the frame in which modernization can occur and the legal system can
operate. 26 The legal system can take many shapes, but none signifi-
cantly chamges the frame.27
Kulcs&u's emphasis on the wide variety of extralegal factors that
influence modernization and the effectiveness of legal systems means
that each society must be analyzed separately. His approach, therefore,
probably will not lead to any significant cross-societal theory explaining
the development process or the role of law in that process. The most
that can be expected are detailed analyses of individual societies and
21. See David Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of
Law and Development, 82 YALE L.J. 1, 4-11, 16-21 (1972) (describing law and development
movement).
22. See Snyder, supra note 20, at 737-42, 747-61 (describing views of underdevelop-
ment theorisis).
23. KurpsAR, supra note 20.
24. Id. at 12.
25. Id. at 10-16.
26. Id. at 123.
27. Id. at 123-24.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol18/iss1/2
NA VAJO DISPUTE RESOLUTION
generalizations about the experiences of various societies. Many West-
ern scholars, who consider the natural sciences the model for social
sciences, will consider the probable inability to generate explanatory
theory a drawback to Kulcsfr's approach.2 Given the many obstacles
to devising a cross-societal theory explaining the processes of significant
social change, however, his more modest approach is realistic. 29
Kulcsfr's definitional distinction between traditional and modern
societies based on the ability to adapt to changing conditions is prob-
lematic, however, for at least four reasons. First, even traditional
societies change, although more slowly than nontraditional ones. Often
traditional societies broke down when they were conquered and colo-
nized by countries peopled by Europeans or European descendants.
Without conquest and colonization, traditional societies might have
adapted successfully to changing conditions, albeit at a slower pace
than Western countries. Second, nontraditional countries, such as the
former Soviet Union, also do not always successfully adapt to changing
conditions. Third, Kulcsdr has proposed no adequate means of meas-
uring ability to adapt. Finally, his definition contains unwarranted
normative implications. If modern countries adapt better to changing
conditions, it is desirable for countries to be modern.
A better approach is to treat a slow pace of change as one of the
many characteristics typical of traditional societies, and a more rapid
pace as typical of nontraditional ones. The slow pace of change joins
other characteristics typical of traditional societies, such as kinship and
community as the primary social ties, the village as the normal form
of settlement, consensus as the normal means of uniting for joint
action, agriculture as the primary economic activity, and widespread
economic poverty as compared to nontraditional societies. 0 A society
may be categorized as traditional even though it does not have all of
the typical characteristics; none is essential. 31
This article also uses a tripartite classification of societies. To signify
the rejection of both Kulcsdr's use of a society's ability to adapt as
the distinguishing characteristic between traditional and modem soci-
28. See RicHARD J. BERNsTEIN, THE REsTRUCTURING oF Socui, AND PouncA. THEORY
3-54 (1976) (discussing views of scholars seeking to model social sciences after natural
sciences).
29. See Auerbach, supra note 6, at 1234. Auerbach's conclusions concern only the
impact of Western legal systems because we lack "the kind of documentation or the
necessary models or typologies to warrant generalizations that are not trivial about the
function of legal systems" across different types of social systems. Id. See generally
BERNsmN, supra note 28 (using various alternative theoretical perspectives to critique
efforts to achieve "scientific" explanations of social phenomena).
30. See KuI.csR, supra note 20, at 7, 24-25 (identifying several typical characteristics).
31. This approach does not eliminate the problem posed by the lack of an adequate
means of measuring the ability to adapt, but eliminates or reduces the impact of the other
deficiencies in Kulcsdr's distinction of a traditional society.
No. 1]
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eties and the rejection of the normative component within his termi-
nology, societies are labelled as either traditional, intermediate, or
nontraditional. Intermediate societies possess too many characteristics
of both" traditional and nontraditional societies to be meaningfully
characterized as either. Obviously, any classification with only three
classes lumps together societies with gross differences in salient char-
acteristics, but it is adequate for purposes of this article.
Using these definitions, the Navajos formed a traditional society
prior to contact with forces of the United States, even though they
did not have all of the typical characteristics. Like many present-day
third world nations, the dine'd have become an intermediate society
during the twentieth century. They have incorporated many nontra-
ditional elements into their society as a response to changing economic
and political conditions, while retaining important components of their
traditional culture. This article examines the efforts of the Navajos to
cope with the pressures caused by this transformation, with primary
emphasis on the methods of dispute resolution and the rules governing
promises and promissory liability.
III. Traditional Navajo Society and Dispute Resolution
A. Early History
The predecessors of the dine'd migrated to the Southwest United
States from what is now Alaska and western Canada prior to 1500.
The early Navajos probably subsisted primarily through hunting, gath-
ering and simple agriculture. They lived in scattered small bands, and
did not have a distinct cultural or political identity. 2
When the early Navajos arrived in the southwest, they encountered
the Pueblos, Native Americans who lived in relatively large permanent
communities with sophisticated religious rituals and agricultural prac-
tices, including animal husbandry. Subsequently, Spaniards entered the
area from the south and subjugated the Pueblos. During the late
seventeenth century, thousands of Pueblos, fearing Spanish reprisals
for a revolt, fled their towns and settled among the dine' s. The Pueblos
brought their knowledge of agriculture and crafts such as weaving and
pottery making, their religious and social concepts, and their livestock,
primarily sheep and goats. Intermarriage and fusion of the cultures
quickly transformed the Navajos.33
Influenced by the Pueblos among them, the dine'J became primarily
dependent on sheep and goat herding during the eighteenth and early
32. See BALEY, supra note 11, at 11-13.
33. See id. at 13-15; EDWARD H. SpicER, CYCLES OF CONQUEST: THE IMPACT OF
SPAIN, Mxco, AND THE UNITED STATES ON THE INDIANS OF THE SOUTHWEST, 1533-1960,
at 212 (1962).
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nineteenth centuries, while farming, hunting and gathering declined in
importance. Raiding, primarily on Pueblos and Spaniards, increased
dramatically as a means of supplementing livestock numbers. The
transformed economy apparently was a success: the Navajos' numbers
increased and their territory expanded.3 4 By the mid-nineteenth century,
the dine'j occupied much of what is now northwestern New Mexico,
northeastern Arizona, southeastern Utah, and southwestern Colo-
rado. 3
The Navajos' incorporation of Pueblo agricultural practices and
religious beliefs was the first known demonstration of an uncharacter-
istic ability for traditional societies. Most traditional societies resist
change.3 6 The dine'6 have been much more open, readily incorporating
elements of foreign cultures. No scholar has offered a completely
adequate explanation for this ability, although at least two factors
have probably contributed. The lack of centralized religious or political
leadership has permitted greater opportunity for varied responses to a
crisis, 37 and the domination of active verbs in the Navajo language
reflects and reinforces the view "that things are constantly undergoing
processes of transformation.., and that the essence of life and being
is movement. ' 38 Regardless of the full explanation, the ability to
incorporate elements of foreign cultures has continued into the twen-
tieth century.3 9
In 1848, the United States acquired most of what is now the
southwestern United States by virtue of its vict6ry in the Mexican
War, thereby inheriting the problem posed by Navajo raiding. Fifteen
years later, federal troops and New Mexico volunteers conducted a
major campaign throughout Navajo territory, destroying crops and
seizing herds. Facing starvation, many of the dine's surrendered during
the winter of 1863-64. 40 Eventually 8500 were forced to make the
"Long Walk" to a reservation in eastern New Mexico. "[S]ick Nav-
34. See BAIEy, supra note 11, at 16-21; SpicER, supra note 33, at 213-15.
35. Navajo Tribe v. United States, 23 Indian CI. Comm. 244, 254, 272 (1970). The
Indian Claims Commission was a quasi-judicial commission created in 1946 that, among
other things, awarded tribes damages for the acquisition by the United States of their
aboriginal lands.
36. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
37. See BA=-LY, supra note 11, at 293. For the past half-century, the Navajos have
had a centralized government which has steadily grown in power. This development may
impede their adaptive ability in the future.
38. GARY W VI RSPOON, LANGUAGE AND ART IN THE NAVAJO UNIVESE 48 (1977).
39. See Navajo Suburbia Develops, Amz. REPunLIc, Mar. 12, 1989, at Al (stating
that whereas other native cultures have been destroyed, "the amazing thing about the
Navajos is their ability, built into their culture, to adapt and change"); WASH. POST, Feb.
9, 1989, at A3, col. I ("the Navajo resemble the Japanese in their skill at melding
traditional culture with new ideas borrowed from elsewhere").
40. See BAmEy, supra note 11, at 9-10.
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ajos, too weak to go on, were shot and left to die; ... pregnant
women, slow afoot, were stabbed by bayonets. '41
Within four years, the government admitted the disastrous nature
of its imprisonment of the Navajos. Many had died and the remainder
subsisted on rations, at great expense to the government. A treaty was
concluded June 1, 1868, and subsequently ratified by the United States
Senate,42 creating a reservation for the Navajos within their aboriginal
homeland and permitting them to return. 43
The relatively short confinement profoundly affected the dine'd. It
damaged their pride and instilled feelings of fear and mistrust of
Anglo-Americans." On the other hand, for the first time the dine'd
saw themselves as a single political unit, unified by common charac-
teristics that made others treat them as a single group.41
Upon returning to their homeland, the dine's had to reestablish
their traditional life. The balance of part III describes certain aspects
of that life. The portrait is oversimplified. For the most part, it is
written as if there were only one traditional Navajo way of life. In
reality, traditional customs apparently vary somewhat from community
to community, and undoubtedly have changed over time.4 Moreover,
41. Sandy Tolan, Showdown at Window Rock, N.Y. Tumas, Nov. 26, 1989, § 6
(Magazine), at 28, 36.
42. Treaty Between the United States and the Navajo Tribe, June 1, 1868, 15 Stat.
667.
43. See BAz.EY, supra note 11, at 9-11; SpicEm, supra note 33, at 219-20.
44. The impact has been described in vivid terms:
Probably no folk has ever had a greater shock. Proud, they saw their
properties destroyed and knew what it was to be dependent upon the largess
of strangers. Not understanding group captivity and accustomed to move
freely over great spaces, they knew the misery of confinement within a
limitDd area. Taken far from the rugged and vivid landscape which they
prized so highly, they lived in a flat and colorless region, eating alien foods
and drinking bitter water which made them ill.
... One can no more understand Navajo attitudes - particularly toward
white people - without knowing of [their captivity] than he can comprehend
Southern attitudes without knowing of the Civil War.
KIucxKxoH & LEInGroN, supra note 10, at 41.
45. PErmE IVERSoN, THE NAvzzo NATION 10 (1981)- It was during the Long Walk
era
that the Navajos were dealt with as one people by the U.S. government and
equally that they began to view themselves politically as one unit. Previously,
the Navajos had had things in common culturally, but politically there had
been little centralization. They had lived in widely scattered locations, and
authority was vested solely in local headmen.... But now things would be
altered. They had gone through the common crucible of the Long Walk
experience.... Their political boundaries had been established: the Navajo
Nation had begun.
Id. (footnote omitted).
46. See infra note 52 (discussing different practices concerning "outfits"). Since the
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a much larger percentage of Navajos lived in a traditional manner in
1880 than in 1980. Nevertheless, the practices among traditional Nav-
ajos have been sufficiently similar despite the geographical and tem-
poral variances and sufficiently distinct from nontraditional societies
to justify the uniform description.
B. Kinship and Community
Traditional Navajo life revolves around the extended family and the
geographically dispersed community. Navajos consider themselves re-
lated to members of their nuclear family, extended family, outfit, and
clan. 47
Traditional extended families, composed generally of mother, father,
unmarried children, married daughters4 and their spouses and unmar-
ried children, and miscellaneous unattached relatives, generally live
"within shouting distance. ' 49 Together with their component nuclear
families, extended families form the core socioeconomic units. Each
member of the extended family is expected to contribute to common
enterprises and can expect assistance from the others. Nuclear and
extended families also are the chief transmitters of Navajo culture
from older generations to children. 0 In isolated rural areas, the struc-
ture and roles of the nuclear and extended families are little different
today than a century ago. In other areas, however, the transformation
of the Navajo economy since World War II is separating many Navajos
from their extended families.5'
The other forms of kinship have had less importance throughout
the reservation period.. Outfits are two or more extended families,
often neighboring, which occasionally work together on major pro-
jects.52 The approximately sixty clans create the broadest kinship af-
1930s, many Navajos have joined the Native American Church and/or Christian denom-
inations. Most converts, however, do not believe that they must reject traditional Navajo
beliefs; rather, they incorporate selected elements of the new beliefs into the traditional
ones. See BAEY, supra note 11, at 279; KENDALL A. BLA.cHARD, THE EcoNoIcs oF
SAINTHOOD: RELIGIOUS CHANGIE AMONG THE RIMROCK NAVAJOS 225 (1977). Membership in
these churches, therefore, has not dramatically altered Navajos' traditional beliefs.
47. See KIucKcoHN & L G-oN, supra note 10, at 100-13.
48. Traditional Navajos are primarily matrilocal, that is, a newly married couple
generally resides with the wife's family. See id. at 102-04.
49. Id. at 109.
50. See id. at 100-05; MARY SHEPARDsON & BLODWEN HAMMOND, THE NAvAJO
MouuNAn ComauNrry: SociAL ORGANIZ TION AND Ku.snip TERM NOLOGY 45 (1970); Wil-
liam T. Adams, New Data on Navajo Social Organizations, 30 PLATEAU 64, 64-65 (1958).
51. KENNETH GraRL.aTH, REn CAPrrAnsa: AN ANALYsIs OF THE NAvAJO ECONOMY
84 (1973).
52. See KIucKHoHN & LEiGHTON, supra note 10, at 109-11 (discussing outfits, based
on study during the 1930s and 1940s); cf. SHEPARDsoN & HAMMoND, supra note 50, at
65-66 (stating that no group at Navajo Mountain corresponds to the "outfit"); Adams,
supra note 50, at 66 (stating that groups in the Shonto region similar to "outfits" are
only historical, not functional, groups).
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filiations. The principal functions of the clans are to regulate marriage
(one cannot marry within one's own clan) and "to provide a wide-
spread network for hospitality. '5
3
The various forms of kinship help to bind people living within a
geographic area. The dine'j live in a dispersed pattern, unlike many
other Native Americans, including their neighbors the Pueblos. Vast
distances often separate the members of one extended family from the
next. Nevertheless, the dine'j have considered themselves members of
far-flung communities,54 sometimes stretching over hundreds of square
miles .
5
The ties to the community are more than social. The dine'd revere
their rugged, desert land, now larger than the state of West Virginia. 6
"[A]Imo,;t every topographical feature plays a vital role in their relig-
ion. Many rocks, mesas, canyons, springs, mountains, and ponds are
reminders of heroic legends or other deeds of religious signifi-
cance.. .,,s They have a special bond, however, for the land within
their local community, a bond created at birth."
53. SusnA.DsoN & HAmmoND, supra note 50, at 52; see KLucKuoHN & LEoirroN,
supra note 10, at 112-13; Adams, supra note 50, at 66.
54. See KIucKzomN & LEiGrrobt, supra note 10, at 117-22 (discussing functioning of
community).
55. Ths Navajo Mountain Community, for example, consisted of about 600 people
in the early 1960s living on approximately 688 square miles of land. SHEPARDSON &
HA moND, supra note 50, at 10-13.
56. Their main reservation encompasses about 24,000 square miles, about the size of
West Virginia, and other lands owned by the United States for the benefit of Navajos
total another 6000 square miles. GanaaxmH, supra note 51, at 3. Most land possessed by
Native Americans throughout the United States actually is owned by the government in
trust.
57. Id. at 86. The opinions of the Navajo courts recognize the importance of the
land to the people. See, e.g., In re Estate of Nelson, I Navajo Rptr. 162, 165 ("Land is
of primary importance to the Navajo people"); Brewster v. Benaly, 1 Navajo Rptr. 128,
131 (Navajo 1977) ("Land is our people's life and heritage").
58. Parents bury the placenta within the area used by the family and subsequently
bury a child's cradleboard beneath the tree from which it came. Charles Miller, Comment,
The Navajo-Hopi Relocation Act and the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, 23
U.S.F. L. R.v. 97, 113 (1988). Navajos, who have for many years fought removal from
land declared by the federal court to belong to a neighboring tribe, the Hopis, have voiced
their attachment to the land:
When you remove us away from our land, you take away our religion, our
way of life. We cannot practice our religion anywhere else, only at our
birthplace where we know the spiritual beings .... If you force us to go
elsewhere we would get sick and we couldn't heal ourselves, we would not
survive. You would be sentencing us to die.
Id. at 114 (quoting Affidavit of Violet Ashkie in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 6, Manybeads v. United States, No. 88 Civ. 0181 (D.D.C. filed
Jan. 26, 1988)).
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The kinship and community allegiances necessitated leadership at
both levels. When possible, decisions were made within kinship units.
Communal decisions, however, were made at meetings led by the local
headman (naat'anii. The naat'anii were selected on a nonhereditary
basis by local communities and had no powers of coercion. Rather,
they had to try to persuade community members to follow their
suggestions - decision by consensus was the goal.59 The dine'd had
no tribal-wide political or religious leadership; leadership was exclu-
sively local.60
The importance of family, community and consensus in traditional
Navajo life is typical of traditional societies throughout the world,
and often serve as important criteria for distinguishing traditional from
nontraditional societies. 61 Thus, although the dine'j are open to change,
they share many important characteristics with traditional societies.
C. Dispute Resolution
Like many traditional societies, 62 the dine'j historically have not
vested individuals with adjudicatory powers. When a dispute occurs,
the extended families involved (disputes that would be between two
individuals under the Anglo-American judicial system are deemed to
involve all members of their families63) try to resolve it themselves. 64
If they are unsuccessful, the families bring the dispute to one or more
respected members of the community, often the naat'anii, for media-
tion. 65 The disputants represent themselves, all of the people present
may speak, and sessions frequently last for several days.66 The media-
tors provide advice, moral exhortation and instruction about Navajo
59. See KucKnoHN & LEIGUTON, supra note 10, at 118-20; Tso, The Tribal Court
Survives, supra note 4, at 24; Van Valkenburgh, Navajo Common Law 1. Notes on
Political Organization, Property and Inheritance, 9 Mustmx Norms: MusEum oF N. Agiz.
17, 17-19 (1936) [hereinafter I Van Valkenburgh]. The naat'anii also played an important
role in dispute resolution, discussed below. See infra text accompanying note 65.
60. Leadership patterns have changed more rapidly since World War II than kinship
and community ties. See infra notes 146-80 and accompanying text.
61. See supra text accompanying note 30.
62. See KutLcsA, supra note 20, at 37-38; Brandfon, Tradition and Judicial Review,
supra note 4, at 995.
63. See Interview with Judge Wayne Cadman, in Chinle, Navajo Nation, Arizona
(May 15, 1991) [hereinafter Cadman Interview].
64. SaEPARnsoN & HAmmoND, supra note 50, at 129.
65. KLucKHomN & LEIcHroN, supra note 10, at 120-21; Tso, The Tribal Court
Survives, supra note 4, at 24.
66. Comment of Navajo Nation Chief Justice Tom Tso, in Interview with Chief
Justice Tom Tso, Associate Justice Raymond Austin, and Associate Justice Homer Blue-
house, of the Navajo Supreme Court, in Window Rock, Navajo Nation, Ariz. (May 13,
1991). Hereinafter citations to this authority will be shortened to "Interview with Justices,"
followed by the name of the particular justice who made the comment to which reference
is made, e.g., "Interview with Justices (Tso)."
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1993
16 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
traditions. The result, generally, is that the parties reach an agreement
by consensus, often involving a payment in kind.67
This procedure has significant benefits. Everyone has a chance to
speak, avoiding the frustration that parties in Anglo-American courts
often feel in not being able to tell their stories in their own ways. 68
The decision is reached by mutual agreement, reducing the resentment
which arises from adjudications which one party perceives to be unfair.
The process, however, also has drawbacks. It requires all parties to
feel a responsibility to the community to reach a consensus, and is
less efficacious when an outsider causes an injury. 69 It works in part
because the community places strong informal pressure on its members
to cooperate and compromise,70 possibly penalizing the more concili-
atory disputants. 7' When the parties nevertheless fail to reach consen-
sus, the aggrieved has no recourse, the matter is dropped as too
"heavy," and resentments sometimes smolder.72 In short, when parties
are strongly committed to resolving the dispute, the process generally
serves to reaffirm group identity by reestablishing harmonious rela-
tionships according to community values. 7 When they are not, the
aggrieved may have no remedy at all.
67. See Tso, The Tribal Court Survives, supra note 4, at 24, 25; Van Valkenburgh,
Navajo Common Law Il" Etiquette-Hospitality-Justice, 10 MusEUM NoTs: MusEUM oF
N. Aiz. 39, 39-42 (1938) [hereinafter 3 Van Valkenburgh].
According to one Anglo-American attorney:
[W]hen I first got here [1960s] there was definitely a system of paying for
your wrong. I can remember in criminal cases where you would have two
Navajo, a Navajo victim and a Navajo defendant, and one of the things
you tried to do was say, can you solve this in the Navajo way.... The
Navajo way was I'd give you four goats and five sheep and we'll call it
even and the person who was wronged lots of times would take that ....
[A]lithough they would have formal charges pending against them ... the
prosecutor simply said we'll work this out in the Navajo way ....
Hynes Interview, supra note 17.
68. Interview with Justices (Tso), supra note 66; see RicHARD D, zio, THE CAPABmrrY
PRoBLEm 3N CoNTRAcT LAw: Fu=RRni READINGS ON WEiLL-KNowN CAsES 26, 42, 164-65
(1978) (recounting frustration of plaintiffs in two recent prominent contract cases over
inability to tell their stories without interruptions).
69. See infra text accompanying note 211 (discussing inadequacy of system to deal
with misdemeanors committed by young adults without ties to the community).
70. SHEPARDsoN & HAmmoND, supra note 50, at 131; cf. Zion, supra note 4, at 98,
100-01 (using judicial power to force Navajos to mediate disputes could result in a return
to violence and oppression in bringing about supposed consensus); Brandfon, Tradition
and Judicial Review, supra note 4, at 995 (stating that the ability of native groups "to
come to a consensus may be seen as the ability to wield power as a group").
71. Cf Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100
YALE L.J. 1545 (1991) (stating that mandatory mediation of child custody disputes may
disempower women, largely because their sense of self generally may be more "relational"
than men's).
72. See SHEPARDSON & HAmmoND, supra note 50, at 132-33.
73. See Brandfon, Tradition and Judicial Review, supra note 4, at 994-97 (discussing
native dispute resolution in general).
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Although the community has no means of enforcing mediated agree-
ments, the offending family normally performs.7 4 The willingness to
adhere to the mediated result despite the lack of formal enforcement
powers demonstrates both the residents' commitment to community
values and the community's power to impose its will through informal
means.
The central concept in Navajo socioreligious thought,7 5 h6zhq, pro-
vides the ideological foundation for the dine'eds ability to resolve
disputes without an adjudicatory system. This concept is almost im-
possible to render into English because it incorporates moral and
esthetic concepts within an all-encompassing framework.7 6 "We can
say that h6zhq refers to the positive or ideal environment. It is beauty,
harmony, good, happiness, and everything that is positive, and it refers
to an environment which is all-inclusive."n According to the Chief
Justice of the Navajo Supreme Court, h6zhq, which he translates as
"beauty" and "harmony," "brings peace and understanding. It brings
youngsters who are mentally and physically healthy and it brings long
life. Beauty is people living peacefully with each other and with
nature." 78 Members of a community generally strive to regain the
harmony which is lost during a dispute by reaching consensus on a
resolution.
As discussed below, Navajo use of mediation to resolve disputes
has declined and the process itself has been altered during the past
decades as the court system has gained increasing acceptance.7 9 Tra-
ditional dispute resolution, however, remains a viable means of re-
solving disputes even today.
D. Customs and Attitudes Concerning Disputes over Broken
Promises and Economic Success
Navajo community members have resolved a wide variety of disputes
by traditional mediation techniques. Many of the disputes have in-
74. See SHmEPARsoN & HAMMOND, supra note 50, at 132.
75. Navajos have no word equivalent to the English word "religion." KsucKHom,
& LEiGHTON, supra note 10, at 179. What Anglo-Americans would identify as Navajo
religion permeates their entire culture. Religious beliefs are inseparable from social or
economic beliefs. The Navajos' "world is still a whole. Every daily act is colored by their
conceptions of supernatural forces, ever present and ever threatening." Id. at 178-79; see
also GiBaPETn , supra note 51, at 85-86 ("religion is all pervasive in [the Navajo's] daily
affairs ... religious elements are not separated from the secular elements"). Many
traditional societies, like the Navajos, have a relatively undifferentiated system of socio-
religious rules that cover all aspects of life. See KuLCsAR, supra note 20, at 36-37.
76. See WrmmusooN, supra note 38, at 23-24.
77. Id. at 124. But see Jom, R. FAPMaUA, THE MAIN STAtx: A SYNTHMSS oF NAvyo
PHmIosoPHY 31-38 (1984) (disputing that h6zhq' has a moral component, at least in the
sense that Westerners understand morality).
78. Tso, Decision Making in Tribal Courts, supra note 4, at 233.
79. See infra notes 191-205 and accompanying text.
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volved actions that Anglo-Americans would classify as criminal, such
as murder, battery, and sexual crimes; the dine'd traditionally had no
prosecutors, no jails and no distinctions between civil and criminal.80
United States courts would not have considered other disputes, such
as over accusations of witchcraft, at all."' Only a small percentage of
disputes apparently have arisen from what United States courts would
consider to be broken contracts.12 For example, of the 596 disputes
over thirty-three years in one Navajo community tabulated by two
researchers, only four, for debt, certainly involved promissory liability.
Three of those were resolved in the tribal courts and one by self-help
- none by mediation.83
Even to speak of Navajo customs concerning broken promises
imports foreign concepts. As was typical in traditional cultures, the
dine'J did not have a body of customs for breach of contract separate
from the customs for other types of wrongs. 4 Nevertheless, some
understanding of the traditional attitudes which Navajos bring to a
contention that a promise has been broken is necessary in order to
appreciate the differences between the Navajo customs and the con-
tract, consumer, and commercial law currently being applied in the
Navajo courts.
One reason for the relatively small number of disputes over broken
promises, compared to Anglo-American experience, is that, until after
World War II, Navajos engaged in relatively few transactions that
could generate such disputes. Navajos did not buy or sell real estate,
because neither individuals nor families could convey their customary
use rights to land." Individual family members, including wives and
80. S e SHEPARDSON & HAMoroND, supra note 50, at 134, 138; 3 Van Valkenburgh,
supra note 67, at 39-42.
81. See SHEmARDsoN & HmmoND, supra note 50, at 138.
82. Interview with Justices (Bluehouse), supra note 66; see Cadman Interview, supra
note 63 (stating that of the over fifty cases in Judge Cadman's peacemaker courts, see
infra notes 191-201 and accompanying text, only four have involved promissory liability,
each for failure to repay a debt).
83. SEMPARDSON & HAmoND, supra note 50, at 138-39. Several other disputes may
have involved broken promises, such as those classified under "property," "land dispute,"
and "fraud." Id.
84. cj: HENRY MAINE, ANcENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION wrrH Tm EARLY HISTORY
OF SocmTy AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 355-60 (Frederick Pollock ed. 1906)
(stating that primitive jurisprudence gave priority to the concept of delict, comparable to
the modern concept of tort). James Zion pointed out in private correspondence to the
author that Navajo customs did not distinguish broken promises from other types of
wrongs.
85. See KLucKoHN & LEIGHTON, supra note 10, at 106-07; 1 Van Valkenburgh,
supra note 59, at 20-21. In recent decades, the Navajo Nation and the BIA have worked
to replace customary use rights with a system of permits which can be alienated or
conveyed by will or intestate succession. See NAvAJO TmRB. CODE tit. 3, §§ 781, 784 (1977);
25 C.F.R. §§ 167.8, 167.9 (1990).
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children, did own, and could convey, property which Anglo-Americans
would classify as personal.86 The limited division of labor, however,
generated little incentive for conveyances of personal property: most
extended families were self-sufficient through the same type of enter-
prise, stock raising.
Even when transactions occurred, they were less likely to result in
disputes than in Anglo-American society. Because the dine'd had no
currency, most transactions involved the barter of goods.87 Substantial
time generally does not pass between the time of promise and the time
of performance in barter transactions, reducing the possibility for
disputes arising because circumstances change after the promise is made
but before performance is due.
Despite the relative infrequency of promissory disputes, the tradi-
tional economy did give rise to some requiring mediation. Various
customs probably influenced the resolution of the disputes. A Navajo
strives to keep his promises,8" because relationships between community
members are built on trust.89 Gossip quickly spreads the word if an
individual's promises are of little worth, inhibiting future dealings.9
A Navajo does not, however, keep his promises because it is morally
"wrong" to break them. The dine'V are practically oriented, and
explain the ethics governing their behavior in terms of pragmatic,
immediate concerns. 91 Their precepts conform to normal behavior, not
86. See KucKscHo & Lmom-roN, supra note 10, at 105-09. An individual's ability
to convey productive personal property, such as livestock, however, was restricted. In
times of hardship, stock owned by each member of the family would be slaughtered for
food, and an owner who instead sold stock to satisfy a personal whim faced severe
criticism. Only with respect to unproductive personal property, such as clothing or cere-
monial equipment, was an individual unrestrained in her freedom to convey. Id.
87. Barter remains an important component of the Navajo economy. For example,
when the Navajo Nation adopted four of the articles of the Uniform Commercial Code,
the Tribal Council added a section excluding barter transactions in which the aggregate
market value of the goods and services involved does not exceed $10,000, so that tribal
customs and usages will apply to "the types of transactions found in the traditional
Navajo economy." U.C.C. § 1-110 & official comment.
88. Words of commitment, when first uttered, may not constitute a binding promise.
Traditionally, a statement or promise must be repeated four times before becoming a
commitment. See GLADYs RnicHARD, NAVAjo RUGION: A STUDY OF SYAMoUsM 130, 133
(2d ed. 1963).
89. See 1 DAN ViczrI Er AL., Tn LAW OF ram PEOPLE: DrINE' Bman HAZ'AANII 16
(1972) [hereinafter cited as I Vicn]; Interview with Justices (Bluehouse), supra note 66.
90. See SnPARDSON & H.lAmmom, supra note 50, at 129.
91. See BLNcHARr), supra note 46, at 189; KaucKnomN & LEIGHroN, supra note 10,
at 297-98. Kluckhohn and Leighton explain:
The difference in the presentation of these ideals [truth and honesty] by
whites and Navahos lies in the reasons advanced. The Navaho never appeals
to abstract morality or to adherence to divine principles. He stresses mainly
the practical considerations: "If you don't tell the truth, your fellows won't
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an idealized vision of how people should act.92
A promise customarily is binding even without Navajo analogues
to the Anglo-American concepts of offer, acceptance, and considera-
tion.93 Nevertheless, their pragmatism generally ensures mutuality of
obligation: "The thought of giving without expectation of return is
absurd."' '
Promises concerning transactions in traditional Navajo society differ
greatly from the form contracts which are a major part of the Anglo-
American commercial world. Because the dine'd lacked a written lan-
guage, all promises (at least until recently) were oral. Their oral nature
virtually ensures that, in traditional culture, promises typically contain
few express terms.95 Navajos also rarely address issues of risk alloca-
tion, because they believe that thinking of and planning against un-
welcome contingencies make them more likely to occur.9 6 Traditionally,
a promisor may be held to express representations, but otherwise a
purchaser bears the risk for inspecting goods for defects prior to
purchase. 97 Finally, the time of performance is. much less important
than in Anglo-American contracts, and probably often is not addressed
at all.98
When a dispute arises, the parties are expected to be flexible in
agreeing to a solution.9 For example, if a debtor is unable to perform
trust you and you'll shame your relatives. You'll never get along in the
world that way." Truth is never praised merely on the ground that it is
"good" in a purely abstract sense, nor do exhortations ever take the form
that the Holy People have forbidden cheating or stealing.
Id. at 297.
92. See RmcHARD, supra note 88, at 130 (stating that a Navajo does not expect
others to act differently than he would; "ideal and practice are the same").
93. See VicENn, supra note 89, at 27.
94. Br.rcHARD, supra note 46, at 192. Ceremonial singers, for example, are always
paid because "a [religious] ceremony could not possibly be efficacious if nothing were
paid." RPcaARs, supra note 88, at 126.
95. See Interview with Justices (Tso), supra note 66.
96. WrrmMSPOON, supra note 37, at 29. Navajos believe that "if one thinks of good
things and good fortune, good things will happen. If one thinks of bad things, bad fortune
will be one's lot." Planning in advance against unwelcome contingencies will cause those
contingencies to occur. Similarly, bad dreams are bad thoughts "likely to be realized unless
treated and transformed through ritual action." Id. at 28.
97. See 1 VicENn, supra note 89, at 16 ("What the [seller] said, and what the thing
bought locked like, counted for everything").
98. Ia. at 19. In general, Navajos place little importance on time or punctuality. See
GnrEATH, supra note 51, at 94; Hynes Interview, supra note 17 (stating that when court
proceedings are running late, Navajos frequently joke about matters running on "Navajo
time").
99. Interview with Justices (Bluehouse), supra note 66. The pressure to be flexible in
contract disputes is consistent with the emphasis on compromise in all types of dispute.
See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
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a contract in a timely manner, the parties normally work out an
arrangement permitting performance, such as repayment of a debt,
over an extended time period. 10 The typical remedy is restitutionary
in nature,' 0 unlike under Anglo-American law, where the promisee's
expectations typically provide the measure of damages.102 The restitu-
tion to which the parties agree becomes the obligation, not only of
the promisor, but of the promisor's family10n
Considered as a whole, traditional Navajo "promissory law" is
consistent with h6zhq. Harmony is maintained by a system which
enforces promises, affords only limited remedies (judged by Anglo-
American standards), but provides familial assurance of payment. The
same desire for harmony underlies Navajo attitudes toward wealth and
economic pursuits. The dine'd applaud moderate accumulation. "[T"]o
be poor without obvious reasons implies that a person is lazy or cruel
or destructive and often evokes ridicule from fellow Navajos. ' 104
Willingness to work hard, necessary for survival in pastoral pursuits
in the rugged desert, is valued highly. 10 5
Other beliefs, however, discourage substantial capital formation.
Navajos are jealous of others' economic success.16 Often wealthy
Navajos are suspected of witchcraft.1 07 Witches have the power to
cause economic harm and physical injury or death to their victims.
Navajos use rituals to turn the witch's evil back on the witch and
100. Interview with Justices (Bluehouse), supra note 66.
101. See SPARnsoN & HAmmoND, supra note 50, at 131; 3 Van Valkenburgh, supra
note 67, at 43.
102. See, e.g., E. ArwA FARNswoRTH, CoNTRAcTs 871-72 (2d ed. 1990). This difference
is unsurprising. The expectation measure is designed to give the promisee the profits
expected if the contract had been performed. The Navajos place little value on profit
maximization, see infra notes 106-10 and accompanying text, and will therefore see less
need to protect the promisee's expectations, as opposed to the promisee's reliance damages.
Judges sharing this attitude may be reluctant to award large damages based on frustrated
expectations. See infra text accompanying notes 339-40.
103. Interview with Justices (Austin), supra note 66. See supra text accompanying note
74 (discussing family contribution toward payment required of liable party in all types of
disputes).
104. GmBREATH, supra note 51, at 93.
105. Id. at 91; KIucKEoHu & LEiGH=oN, supra note 10, at 299. As one government
superintendent wrote:
No task is so dirty, no task is so hard, no condition so unpleasant as to
cause them to refuse.... I have seen them working for themselves, per-
forming, with worn-out tools, tasks that seem impossible.... The ability,
combined with a great desire, to labor is one of the outstanding characteristics
of the Navajo. From their earliest infancy they are taught to labor and to
save.
BAImEY, supra note 11, at 160.
106. Cadman Interview, supra note 63.
107. GmBP.EATH, supra note 51, at 88; KLUC H HN & LEiGHToN, supra note 10, at
247.
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sometimes kill the suspected witch without waiting for the ritual to
work.108
Navajos also are expected to share their wealth with poorer members
of their extended families and often with more distant relatives as well.
For example, many expect relatives who own businesses to share
merchandise, and those who refuse risk ostracism and charges of
witchcraft.Y09
Finally, although Navajos value willingness to work hard, work
should not become an end in itself or result in immoderate property
accumulation. "Working for work's sake or acquiring money for
money's sake ... doles] not motivate the Navajos to work."" 0
During the late nineteenth century, as discussed below,", the dine'd
began to come into contact with the market economy of the United
States. Certain Navajo customs and beliefs'12 were conducive to ac-
ceptance of a market economy and Anglo-American traisactional law.
Others, however, such as the beliefs discouraging property accumula-
tion, were not.
The Navajos could not neatly excise the doctrines which were
counterproductive to participation in the Anglo-American society and
keep the rest. The differences between the relevant Anglo-American
and traditional Navajo attitudes and customs run deep. They reflect
fundamentally divergent visions of the role of the individual in society.
For traditional Navajos, as for many traditional peoples, an individual
has relatively little freedom to attempt to better himself economically
108. Ki.ucKHoNr & Lmom'oN, supra note 10, at 187-89. The two anthropologists
wrote, "[w]itchcraft belief is extraordinarily persistent. Navajos who seem to be completely
'emancipated' from other aspects of their religion will still show tremendous fear of
witches .... 1" Id. at 129. Witches play an important role in the detective novels of Tony
Hillerman, the primary source of information about the Navajos for many Americans.
See ToNY HaLnmAN, SKmwAsLKns (1986); TONY HuimuiwA, Tin BLEmisN WAY (1970).
Many Native American tribes believed in witchcraft. Witchcraft accusations served to
define the boundaries of the consensual group, and the witch frequently was expelled or
killed, thereby reinforcing the definition. Brandfon, Tradition and Judicial Review, supra
note 4, at 996.
109. See GarnnATE, supra note 51, at 82-83; see also Kiucimom, & Lmorrow, supra
note 10, at 247. One non-Navajo attorney believes that Navajos frequently have no assets
even though they have a good salary because "it's just a constant requirement that you
have to help your friends or your relatives," Hynes Interview, supra note 17. Another
observes that Navajos pawn jewelry or other valuables partly to permit them regretfully
to decline when a relative asks to use that property. Interview with James J. Mason,
Attorney, Gallup, New Mexico (May 15, 1991) [hereinafter Mason Interview].
110. GmRATm, supra note 51, at 91.
111. See infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 88-94, 104-05. The customs and beliefs dis-
cussed above include the pragmatic orientation, the expectation that transactions will
involve an exchange of values, the value placed on hard work, and the enforceability of
promises.
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by his own efforts and contracts.' Instead, the status of his family
largely determines his position in society. The family's status may
improve, but only slowly lest witchcraft charges follow. Anglo-Amer-
ican society, by contrast, elevates the freedom of the autonomous
individual." 4 The "self-made" man is a hero.
The next part contains a historical summary of the impact on the
dine'j of their collision with Anglo-American society. Given these
areas of compatibility and conflict in beliefs, it is unsurprising that
the dine's have integrated partially, but only partially, into the United
States economy.
IV. The Transformation of the Navajo Economy and Government
A. The Herding Economy: 1868-1930
During their first approximately sixty years on the reservation, the
dine'j largely continued their traditional way of life and flourished,
especially in comparison to other Native Americans. Between 1868 and
1930, the population approximately quadrupled to 39,000,115 whereas
native populations overall declined." 6 For most of the period, the
Navajos generally were self-supporting."17
A resurrected and intensified herding economy fueled their success.
During the nineteenth century, herding was primarily, subsistence-ori-
ented (providing milk and meat), although it had a significant market
component as well." 8 The industry became primarily market-oriented
during the next century, although this change in orientation was more
the product of federal government policy and the desires of white
traders than it was the Navajos' own choice." 9
The dine'd worked hard for their prosperity. Despite their hunger
during the early reservation years, they did not butcher their productive
animals for food, preferring to build herd numbers. 20 Many supple-
mented their stock income with income from crafts, principally rug
weaving and silversmithing.' 2' In addition, during the 1920s, as income
113. See supra notes 84-86, 106-10 and accompanying text.
114. See P.S. ATrAH, Tan RisE A FALL OF Fananom OF CONTRACT 40-41 (1979).
115. See BAI.=Y, supra note 11, at 9, 105.
116. See ALAN L. SoRmK, AmucA INfLTANS AN FaEnn. Am 4 (1971).
117. See BALY, supra note 11, at 50 (the period until 1890); id. at 100-04 (the 1890s);
id. at 184 (stating that the Depression of the 1930s ended the period of Navajo self-
sufficiency). In 1890, the Navajos were considered one of the two wealthiest tribes in the
country. Id. at 96.
118. See BAILEY, supra note 11, at 36-45; infra notes 128-45 and accompanying text
(discussing roles of traders).
119. See BALEY, supra note 11, at 124-39; LAWRENCE D. WEIss, Tan DEvELoPMENT
op CAPrrAlISm IN THE NAV AJO NATION: A PoLTIcAL-EcoNomc HISTORY 83-84 (1984).
120. See BAuzy, supra note 11, at 36-45.
121. See id. at 50-56, 150-55.
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from herding and crafts proved insufficient to support the ever-growing
human population, Navajos, especially men, began to accept off-
reservation seasonal employment, primarily unskilled labor on the
railroads and in the agricultural fields.'2
As a result of the Navajos' success and their pattern of scattered
settlement over a vast territory, the government made little attempt to
undermine their beliefs and social structure and replace them with
elements of Anglo-American culture, as it did on other reservations.12
Schooling was only a partial exception. Whereas most native children
on other reservations were forced into government-run schools,'14 only
about 3%0 of school-age Navajo children attended school by 1898, and
less than 1% of Navajos could speak English.2' The government
constructed more schools and Navajo resistance to Anglo-American
edication declined somewhat during the early twentieth century, but
as late as 1930 only about 40% of school-age children attended school. 2 6
That same year, 71% of the tribe spoke no English and only 10%
spoke it "reasonably well." 127
Although government agents had relatively little influence on the
Navajo, one group of Anglo-Americans, the traders, did. The first
trading post was established around 1870; the number increased to
seventy-nine on and around the reservation by 1900 and to 154 by
1930.128 Historically, what families could not produce themselves they
had obtained by barter with other Navajos or by trade with members
of other tribes. By 1930, however, traders had almost completely
supplanted intertribal trade and displaced much intratribal trade.129
122. See id. at 155-60; Wmss, supra note 119, at 84-93.
123. Until approximately 1870, the government primarily sought to remove natives to
areas that other Americans would not want, where they were largely left alone. By 1870,
it was apparent that the entire continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific would be settled,
and the government increasingly created enclaves, or reservations, for the natives. On
these reservations, natives became dependent on the federpl government, which in turn
strove to destroy tribal leadership, religious beliefs and culture and assimilate individual
natives into the national culture. Individual natives were allotted small parcels of land on
many reservations, and surplus lands were opened to settlement by non-natives. See
generally CoHEN, supra note 14, at 127-43; FREDmERIc E. Hoxm; A FINAL PROnsE: Tim
CAMwAIGN TO AssnmATE T E INDIANS, 1880-1920 (1984).
124. See generally Hoxn, supra note 122, at 53-70 (discussing development of edu-
cational policies for Native Americans).
125. See BA=LEY, supra note 11, at 63-66, 169.
126. See id. at 168-71.
127. Ki.ucKHoml & LEIMUTON, supra note 10 at 91 (1946). Native Americans of other
tribes were much more familiar with English. Nationwide, in 1930, only 17% of Native
Americans over ten years old were unable to speak English. LEONARD A. CARSON, INDIANS,
BuREAucmks, AND LAND: THE DAWES AcT AND nm DEcLINE OF INDIAN FAaMINO 201,
at tbl. A.21 (1981).
128. WEIsS, supra note 118, at 51, 73.
129. See BA=LEY, supra note 11, at 50-62, 147-50; WEISs, supra note 118, at 53-61, 72-
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Two factors largely explain the traders' displacement of traditional
commerce. First, the Navajos increasingly accepted and desired the
products of Anglo-American material culture. By the early 1900s, a
growing number began to live in cabins instead of the traditional
hogans, use Anglo-American furniture and equipment, and wear An-
glo-American clothing.130 Second, traders extended credit to the Nav-
ajos to permit purchase of those goods. Credit was necessary because
the dine'd had no currency' and their economy was cyclical - herding
produced goods for trade only twice a year, wool in the spring and
lambs in the fall.1 2
The relationships between Navajos and traders differed greatly from
the relationships between most Anglo-American merchants and con-
sumers. Until after World War II, Navajos generally had no choice
but to deal with a particular trader. Once Navajos began to switch
from purely subsistence herding to commercial herding and had ac-
quired a taste for Anglo-American goods, traders represented the only
accessible market for their products and the only accessible source of
Anglo-American goods. Moreover, Navajos could not pick and choose
among traders: most were tied to a particular trader by geographic
monopoly and by debt.' Reciprocally, the trader was bound to the
Navajos of the community in which the trading post was located; if
the trader did something to alienate those Navajos, he could not attract
other customers because of their ties to other traders. 34
Consequently, a successful trader entered into a never-ending series
of credit-based transactions with each of his repeat customers, few if
any of which involved money, at least until after World War II. The
trader maintained a running account for each of the families who did
business at the post. Most families purchased on credit, which they
repaid twice a year, in the spring with the wool from shearing and in
the fall with lambs. 3 To earn additional credit the women of many
families wove rugs for market according to the trader's specifications
and using materials purchased from the trader on credit. Traders
required some customers to secure their credit with pawned goods,
130. See BAIEY, supra note 11, at 173-78; ItucKuomi & LmmoN, supra note 10,
at 86-90.
131. See Stephen Conn & Richard Reichbart, The Trading Post, in 1 VicErn, supra
note 89, at 75 [hereinafter Coan & Reichbart] ("The trader was inevitable" as "the
intermediary ... between a monetary and a non-monetary society.").
132. See BAuzY, supra note 11, at 50-62; Waiss, supra note 118, at 48-61.
133. See Wmss, supra note 118, at 53-61.
134. See Hynes Interview, supra note 17 (stating that the trader had to maintain a
benevolent attitude toward the Navajos).
135. Few statistics are available concerning the extent of debt, but one trader reported
in the 1950s that two-thirds of all wool production in his area was transferred to him to
satisfy past debts. Wamss, supra note 118, at 139.
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usually jewelry; others, generally wealthier, were granted unsecured
credit, based on the trader's knowledge of their herds.
3 6
Navajos' long-term relationships with traders resembled their tra-
ditional relationships with each other in many ways.1 7 Agreements
typically were oral. The relationship did not have a clear beginning in
offer and acceptance, a performance period, or a discharge upon
completion. It was subject to continuous adjustments. If Navajos were
unable to pay debts when due, traders generally were willing to extend
the time for payment. Traders frequently held onto pawned goods
until the owner died, even if the secured debt had been long in arrears,
and allowed debtors to take out the pawn, especially jewelry, for big
events. 3t
The Navajos' commercial relationships, with each other and with
traders, bore little similarity to the type of transaction which formed
the paradigm for traditional Anglo-American contract law. This law,
with its doctrines of offer and acceptance, consideration, and expec-
tation-based damages, impliedly regards the typical commercial rela-
tionship as involving a single, discrete transaction.3 9 By contrast,
traders and Navajos often "treat[ed] their contracts more like mar-
riages than like one-night stands."' 14
136. Hynes Interview, supra note 17 ("The amount of credit that he would extend
would depend on what he thought their ability to repay would be, because he knew how
many sheep they had, how many cows they had, he knew their ability to earn money").
137. See Interview with Justices (Austin), supra note 66 (stating that relationships
between a trader and the Navajos of the community in which he lived had many elements
similar to promissory relationships among Navajos).
138. Hynes Interview, supra note 17; Mason Interview, supra note 109. As traders
have moved off reservation since World War II, some may have lost the willingness to
retain pawn indefinitely. See Reeves v. Foutz & Tanner, Inc., 617 P.2d 149 (1980) (imposing
penalties on merchant who tried to circumvent UCC's provisions for resale of pawned
jewelry after Navajo debtors defaulted).
139. During the last three decades, several scholars, led by Stewart Macauley and Ian
MacNeil, have criticized the orientation of Anglo-American contract law toward discrete
transactions and advocated a "relational" perspective. Perhaps the best single source for
their views is Symposium, Law, Private Governance and Continuing Relationships, 1985
Wis. L. REv. 461, which contains articles by Macauley, Macnel, and thirteen other
scholars critiquing their theories or applying them in various contexts. See also IAN
MAcNelm, Tam NEw SocIAL CoTRnAcT (1980); Stewart Macauley, Non-Contractual Rela-
tions in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc. Ray. 55 (1963).
140. Robert W. Gordon, Macauley, MacNeil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and
Power in Contract Law, 1985 Wis. L. RE,. 565, 569. Ongoing complex commercial
relationships are common in traditional and intermediate societies. For example, Connec-
ticut around 1700 was "something of a backwater," with little commerce outside the local
community. Trading relationships "tended to be familial and intimate." Bruce H. Mann,
Rationality, Legal Change, and Community in Connecticut, 1690-1760, 14 LAw & Soc.
Ray. 187, 193 (1980). Creditors recorded transactions - largely barter - in a "book,"
without express terms governing repayment. If the creditor demanded repayment and the
debtor refused, the creditor could sue on the book account. This relatively unstructured
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These types of continuing relationships, however, have a "dark
side": "where the contours of obligations are constantly shifting, the
effects of power imbalances are not limited to the concessions that
parties can extort in the original bargain," and "can gradually extend
to govern every aspect of the relation in performance.' ' 141 Many traders
exploited the Navajos trapped into doing business with them, taking
exorbitant markups on goods sold, 142 charging astronomical interest
rates, 143 and making huge profits on the products purchased from
Navajos and resold in the Anglo-American world.'" They made for-
tunes while their Navajo customers continued to live at subsistence
levels. 145
This process of integrating the Navajos into the larger economy,
both through their taste for Anglo-American goods and their produc-
tion of livestock and crafts for resale by traders into the market,
proved to be the first step in the transition from a traditional society.
Commonly, merchants make the first inroads into traditional socie-
ties. 146 The next step was forced upon the Navajos against their will.
B. Wage Economy: 1930-Present
The pace of change has accelerated rapidly over the past sixty years.
The Navajo society is no longer traditional. It is now an intermediate
system depended on trust "that the other will fulfill his promises, not necessarily because
of legal coercion, but because not to perform would damage a relationship that each
considers worth preserving." Id. at 194. During the course of the eighteenth century,
Connecticut residents became increasingly involved in the intercolonial economy. Not
surprisingly, to the extent that creditors and debtors were no longer tied by "continuing
relationships" of trust, legal instruments with express repayment terms replaced books as
means of evidencing debt obligations. Id. at 194, 201-08.
141. Gordon, supra note 140, at 570.
142. See Conn & Reichbart, supra note 131, at 69 (stating that one trading post's
prices averaged 35% higher for food and 75% higher for clothing and other dry goods
than the wholesale prices to the post).
143. The debtors frequently did not understand the impact of the interest rates which
the traders charged on the delinquent debt. In the early 1970s, traders off reservation in
Arizona could charge maximum interest of 2% per month, traders off reservation in New
Mexico could charge up to 4% per month, while traders on reservation could charge any
rate they wished. Id. at 76. For food purchased on credit during the same time period,
most on-reservation traders charged interest of 10% a month (120% per year)! 1 VIcEaN,
supra note 89, at 36.
144. See Conn & Reichbart, supra note 131, at 71 (stating that trader's profit on resale
of wool and lambs usually exceeds 100%).
145. Interview with Justices (Tso), supra note 66; Hynes Interview, supra note 17.
146. See Wmss, supra note 118, at 20-22 (discussing typical means by which outside
merchants make peasants dependent, which closely track the methods used by traders with
the Navajos); Snyder, supra note 20, at 750-59 (discussing various ideas of Marxist theorists
concerning integration of underdeveloped economies into world economy dominated by
developed countries).
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society, with significant traditional and nontraditional elements.
Navajos remember the precipitating event with "bitterness and an-
ger."' 47 The government imposed a livestock reduction program that
was "the most devastating experience in Navaho [sic] history since the
imprisonment at Fort Sumner from 1864 to 1868.') 48
Since before 1900, government officials had observed overgrazing
and increasing erosion on the reservation. They did little to rectify the
problems, however, until the 1930s, when the BIA established the
carrying capacity of the range and "purchased" excess stock at prices
which it set. With the Depression wiping out any market for the
purchased stock, the government frequently slaughtered the stock -
the primary measure of wealth for the Navajos - before the horrified
eyes of the dine'Y and left the dead animals in the fields to rot or
bulldozed them into mass graves. 49
The dine'j opposed the program strenuously, not believing that any
reduction was necessary. 50 The opposition had results probably un-
anticipated by the BIA officials. Just as captivity during the nineteenth
century fostered a sense of tribal identity, the struggle against stock
reduction increased Navajo nationalism. This time, however, the new
nationalism had a mouthpiece, the Tribal Council."' The federal gov-
147. IvEnzsoN, supra note 45, at 23.
148. Id. (quoting Sam Ahkeah, Navajo Tribal Council chairman from 1946 to 1954).
149. See BA=,, supra note 11, at 184-93; IvERsoN, supra note 45, at 17, 23-35; Tolan,
supra note 41, at 36.
The stock reduction program, although administered with incredible insensitivity, was
part of a policy designed to strengthen tribal governments and protect tribal resources.
From approximately 1870 through the mid-1920s, the prevailing policy of the United States
had been to destroy tribal cultures and self-governance and to make natives like all other
Americans. See supra note 123. John Colfier, the commissioner of Indian Affairs during
the administration of Franklin Roosevelt, rejected that policy. His administration was
instrumental in preserving tribes as distinct entities. See JENNINos C. WisE & Vna DnLORIA,
JR., THE RED MAN N THE NEw WoRLD DRAsr: A Porrnco-LEAL STUDY wrrT A
PAGEANTRY OF Am cAN INDAN HISTORy 357-60 (1971) (stating that FDR's years as
president were "probably the best years in American history for Indians," largely because
Collier did his job "with devotion and spectacular results").
150. See BAmn.Y, supra note 11, at 185-86; IVERSoN, supra note 45, at 27-29.
151. A historian wrote:
Indeed, if the 1868 treaty reservation provided the foundation for the
Navajo Nation, the livestock reduction era hastened the evolution of Navajo
nationalism. The period represented the most serious disruption of Dineh
lives since the 1860s. The era estranged the tribe from the federal government.
Relations between Washington and Window Rock [the capital of the nation]
would never be the same again. Not only did Collier's other programs suffer,
but the Navajos began the long process of becoming a political unit. The
tribal government mattered. The people could have boycotted it; they could
have shunted it aside as nontraditional. Instead, most of them turned to it
as a way of maintaining a separate, integral Navajo way of life.
IVERSON siupra note 45, at 30.
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ernment had formed the council in the 1920s as a puppet to grant
approval for the exploration for and exploitation of oil on the reser-
vation, 112 but Navajo politicians hostile to the stock reduction program
seized control of the council during the 1930s. They altered the size,
structure and powers of the council, making it a more effective unit
of government for the dine'd.1
53
The council, however, could not reverse the effect of stock reduc-
tion. Herding could no longer even come close to supporting all the
Navajos. Public works programs during the 1930s and employment
opportunities during World War II temporarily hid the impact of the
lost agricultural income.1 54 After 1945, however, the war-related jobs
disappeared, and poverty and hunger spread across the reservation. A
new economic system had to replace the old.Y
55
Wage-earning is the primary foundation of that system. Herding,
which held the central economic role for over a century, has become
only a minor supplemental income source over the last forty years,
although it retains tremendous symbolic importance. 5 6 By 1960, almost
70% of Navajo individual income came from wage labor, about 14%
from welfare payments, and less than 10% from livestock and farm-
ing. 5 7 In the mid-1970s, income from welfare payments had climbed
to 24%, while the percentage of income from wages had declined
marginally and from herding had plummeted to only about 2% of the
total.58
Unlike other Americans, who work primarily for private employers,
Navajos receive well over half of their wages from federal and tribal
government sources. 59 The Navajo Nation itself is the largest em-
152. See Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, No. A-CV-13-89, slip op. at 17-18 (Navajo
Apr. 13, 1989); IVERSoN, supra note 45, at 20-21.
153. See BA=LEY, supra note 11, at 196-97; IVmsoN, supra note 45, at 36-39.
154. See BALEY, supra note 11, at 192-200.
155. See id. at 218-21; IVERSON, supra note 45, at 49-50, 56.
156. The percentage of families holding permits to graze stock has declined steadily,
from 62% in the 1940s, BA=, supra note 11, at 245, to about 16% today, Tolan, supra
note 41, at 31. Moreover, stockraising is not the primary income source for even the few
families with permits. By 1957, 80% of all stock permits in the Navajo Nation were for
between 1 and 100 sheep units, with 400-500 considered sufficient to support a family at
subsistence level. See BAu.Ey, supra note 11, at 203-04, 247. Despite the declining economic
impact, however, grazing rights and traditional grazing areas remain remarkably important
to the people. The Navajo Reporter contains many cases involving disputes over grazing
rights; one estimate is that about 75% of court hearings involve land-use disputes, primarily
over range rights. Wmss, supra note 118, at 141.
157. BA LY, supra note 11, at 257. By contrast, in 1940, even after the stock reduction
program was largely completed, about 44% of the total income came from livestock and
about 30% from wages. KLUCKHOHN & LmcurroN, supra note 10, at 54.
158. See BA.Ey, supra note 11, at 260-61; WEIss, supra note 118, at 137.
159. See BAmEY, supra note 11, at 256.
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ployer. 10 The reservation contains valuable deposits of oil, gas, ura-
nium, and coal, and leases of mining rights have provided most of
the wherewithal for the growth of tribal government.16 1
This income has permitted the Navajo government to expand in
many directions. Since 1950, "the influence of the BIA over Navajo
affairs [has] declined steadily, balanced by a steady growth in the
power of Navajo tribal government. . . . The Navajos [have] succeeded
in reclaiming much of their political autonomy, at least in regard to
the daily management of internal Navajo affairs and programs.' 162
The tribal government also has defended its sovereignty jealously
against any attempts by state governments to regulate or police affairs
on the reservation. 63 The combination of the need to employ Navajos
and the wide scope of governmental activities has produced a large
Navajo bureaucracy.
Despite its successes in many areas, the tribal government has been
repeatedly frustrated in one area - the development of nongovern-
mental enterprise on the reservation. In 1970, the surrounding com-
munities supported about five times as many retail establishments and
up to twenty times as many service establishments per person as were
on the reservation.64 Moreover, the reservation businesses tend to
cluster near BIA or tribal offices or tourist attractions, leaving other
areas even more underserved than the overall statistics indicate. 65 As
a result of the lack of business on the reservation, Navajos' estimated
per capita income in 1970 was less than a third of the estimated figures
160. See KL sA B. K u.ay, NAVAJO LAND UsE: AN ETHNoLocnCAL STUDY 154 (1986).
161. See BAILEY, supra note 11, at 235-37.
162. Id. at 244. The return of autonomy, however, is not complete. The tribe may
act without federal approval only in areas where Congress has not expressly or impliedly
restricted its autonomy. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195 (1985)
(holding that Secretary of Interior approval of taxes which the tribe imposed on a non-
Indian company was unnecessary; government approval is required only when Congress
so specifie). This article discusses several restrictions on the jurisdiction of tribal courts.
See infra notes 221-29 and accompanying text. In addition, federal officials must approve
certain types of tribal actions before they take effect. See Howard Dana & Assocs. v.
Navajo Hous. Auth., I Navajo Rptr. 325, 327 (Navajo 1978) (holding that approval from
HUD, whose funds would be used in project, was necessary in order for housing authority's
contract with architect to be binding). Perhaps most significant, agreements of the tribe
granting any individual or entity any privilege "relative to tribal lands" require prior
approvals of the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. 25
U.S.C. § si (1988).
163. For example, when Arizona voters decided in 1988 that English is the "official
language" of Arizona, the tribe refused to give the law any effect within the Navajo
Nation and announced that English-language geographical names would be translated into
Navajo. WAsH. PosT, Feb. 9, 1989, at A3, col. 1.
164. GmBFATH, supra note 51, at 18-20.
165. Id.
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for New Mexico and Arizona, 16 and about one-half live in poverty.167
Among those reservation businesses are fewer trading posts, al-
though they remain important in isolated rural areas. (The shift to a
wage and welfare economy has produced only slow changes in settle-
ment patterns. Although the reservation now contains several "urban"
areas with over a thousand inhabitants,'6 the great majority of Navajos
still live in rural residential patterns similar to those of a hundred
years before. 69) Several developments worked against the traders after
World War II: the switch to a wage economy reduced the need for a
non-cash credit system, and the improvement of the road system in
the 1950s and Navajo purchases of motor vehicles broke the geographic
monopoly of many traders.170 Navajos found lower prices and greater
selections of Anglo-American products from off-reservation merchants.
Consequently, a high percentage of tribal income is spent outside
Navajo country.'
The weakness of private enterprise on the reservation has elevated
government to an importance probably unparalleled in the Anglo-
American world. Theoretically, the Tribal Council holds sovereign
power. 72 The dine'j do not have a written constitution that creates
three branches of government.173 Instead, the Tribal Council has cre-
ated the executive and judicial branches by resolution. 74
166. Id. at 4.
167. NAVAJO NATION REPORT, supra note 9, at 3. Navajos' average per capita income
is the lowest of the ten largest Indian tribes in the country. CENSUS BuREAu REPORT,
supra note 9. See also supra note 15 (discussing unemployment and poverty figures).
168. Figures for what Anglo-Americans would call towns do not exist, because chapters,
the basic unit of local government in the Navajo Nation, may encompass both urban and
rural areas. The 1989 population estimates for the chapters, however, indicate that the
three largest urban areas are Window Rock-Fort Defiance-Saint Michaels, in the southeast
corner of the reservation, with about 11,000 Navajo residents; Shiprock, in the northeast
corner, with about 8000 Navajo residents; and Tuba City, in the western part, with over
7000 Navajo residents. See NAvAo NATION REPORT, supra note 9, at 4.
169. See WASH. PosT, Feb. 9, 1989, at A3, col. 1 ("Most Navajos are still farmers
and ranchers, living on farms that frequently house four or more generations of a family").
170. See BAILEY, supra note 11, at 268-71.
171. See GELBA TH, supra note 51, at 6-7.,
172. NAvAjo Tam. CODE tit. 2, § 101 (Supp. 1984-85).
173. Pursuant to authority granted by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25
U.S.C. § 476 (1988), many Native American tribes adopted written constitutions during
the 1930s. Largely because of Navajo antagonism to Collier arising from the stock reduction
program, they voted not to adopt the Indian Reorganization Act in 1935. See IvEasoN,
supra note 45, at 33-38. Overall, 189 tribes voted to accept the IRA and adopted
constitutions, while seventy-seven voted to reject it. CozmN, supra note 14, at 150.
174. See NAvAJo Tam. CODE tit. 2, §§ 281, 1001 (1977) (creating position of Chairman
of the Tribal Council and authorizing Chairman to act as chief executive officer); NAvAJo
Tam. CODE tit. 7, § 201 (Supp. 1984-85) (creating the judicial branch). The Navajo Tribe
Organization Chart 1977, which is printed on the pages following NAvAjo Tam. CODE tit.
2, § 4 (1977), places all units of the tribal government within a flow chart, with the
Navajo Tribal Council at the top.
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At least until 1989, reality contrasted with theory. The Chairman
of the Tribal Council accumulated powers throughout the period after
1950, reaching extraordinary levels by Anglo-American standards. The
Chairman headed the executive department, 175 held legislative powers
greater than those of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, 7 6
and was the principal representative of the tribe to the outside world.177
During 1989, the balance of power shifted. Peter MacDonald, who
was serving his unprecedented fourth four-year term as Chairman, 7 1
was accused in hearings conducted by the United States Senate of
accepting bribes and kickbacks from contractors. 79 Within two weeks,
he had lost control of the Tribal Council, which placed him on
administrative leave pending investigation of the allegations and ap-
pointed an interim Chairman."o0 MacDonald fought the leave for five
175. NAvAjo TRm. CODE tit. 2, § 1001(a) (1977).
176. The Chairman chaired meetings of the Tribal Council (a unicameral body), NAVAJO
TRm. CODE tit. 2, § 284(a) (1977), and of its Advisory Committee, NAVAJO TRm. CODE
tit. 2, § 342(a) (Supp. 1984-85). The Tribal Council had four regular sessions per year,
id. § 162(a), and the Advisory Committee, among other things, had the authority "to act
for" the council when it was not in session and to "develop an agenda for" and
"recommend legislation to" the council. Id. § 341(b)(1),(3). In addition to the Chairman,
the Advisory Committee consisted of 18 council members, which after 1981, were "selected
by the [Chairman] with the advice and consent" of the council. Id. § 342. Much of the
nation's legislative power, therefore, was in a committee handpicked by the Chairman.
177. Id. § 1001(a) (1977).
178. The following story illustrates some of the reasons for MacDonald's appeal to
Navajos. Seven years before he became Chairman, he attended a Tribal Council session,
at which two council members were in heated debate. According to MacDonald, the BIA
representative ordered them to stop arguing, and announced, "If you guys continue to
act like children, I'm going to throw every one of you out of this council chamber. I'm
going to put a padlock on it. And I'm not going to let you back in until you learn to
behave like adults!" The council members stopped their debate and sat down. Tolan,
supra note 41, at 38.
After his election, MacDonald insisted that the BIA deed the council chambers to the
tribe. If not, the council would convene outside. The BIA acquiesced, and MacDonald
had the locks changed. Id.
With title in hand, while presiding at his first Tribal Council session as Chairman, he
told the BIA representative, "If I hear any outbursts from you or your staff ... I will
have our police escort you from these chambers. And you won't be let back in until you
promise to behave like adults!" Id.
179. Jacob V. Lamar, Letting Down the Tribe, Tmim, Mar. 6, 1989, at 30. The most
flagrant alleged abuse concerned the tribe's purchase of a 491,000-acre ranch in Arizona.
MacDonald allegedly arranged with a broker that the ranch would be purchased for $26.2
million by a middleman and then sold to the tribe two days later for $33.4 million, with
MacDonald to receive up to $750,000 of the profits. MacDonald had received the first
$75,000 at the time of the Senate hearings. Id.; Atchison, supra note 15, at 32.
180. See Navajo Leader Out of Power, Aiz. Rm'uBuc, Feb. 25, 1989, at BI. The
Navajo Supreme Court upheld the council's power to place a Chairman on administrative
leave, provided that there were adequate grounds and appropriate procedures were fol-
lowed. Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, No. A-CV-13-89, slip op. at 15-29 (Navajo Apr.
13, 1989). The council then appointed an interim Chairman, who eventually served the
balance of MacDonald's term. Election Panel Kills MacDonald's Run, Aiuz. REPumLIC,
Oct. 25, 1990, at BI.
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months, with the courts serving as the arbiter of the dispute between
council and Chairman. Finally, he agreed to accept the leave while
criminal charges against him and other members of his administration
worked their way through the tribal courts where he was ultimately
convicted.""
The Tribal Council used the opportunity to restructure the executive
and legislative branches of government in December 1989 by stripping
the Chairman (renamed the president) of legislative powers and creating
a system with greater checks and balances.8 2 It is far too early to pass
judgment on the efficacy and stability of the new structure. Regardless
of its success, however, it appears, as discussed in part V below, that
the courts have been accepted as a separate and important component
of the Tribe's government.
As this historical sketch has shown, the dine'j have undergone
remarkable changes during the last sixty years. They have switched
from an economy almost exclusively dependent on agriculture and
crafts to one primarily based on wage-earning. Whereas before they
had no centralized governmental authority, they now have a centralized
government with a large bureaucracy. A formerly self-sufficient people
now is reliant in large part on welfare, bringing the problems that
often accompany such dependence.
These economic and political developments parallel those experi-
enced by many intermediate societies. Inability of the nonagricultural
sector of the economy to absorb those who can no longer support
themselves through farming and of traditional governance mechanisms
to deal with the changes in society characterize this period in many
societies. Frequently, they respond by adopting nontraditional govern-
ment structures, including a large bureaucracy.8 3
Changes in legal norms and procedures almost always accompany
the economic and political transformation of formerly traditional
nations. The political and economic changes in Navajo society during
the last sixty years have created pressures for the adoption of nontra-
ditional means of resolving disputes and nontraditional principles to
181. See Tolan, supra note 41, at 31; MacDonald Taken Off Ballot, PHOENIX GAzE-rn,
Oct. 25, 1990, at B7.
182. The Tribal Council created the position of Speaker of the Council to preside over
council meetings and head the legislative branch, gave the tribal president a veto power
subject to override by a two-thirds vote of the council, and reorganized the council
committee system to strip the Advisory Committee of disproportionate powers. See Bennett
v. Navajo Bd. of Election Supervisors, No. A-CV-26-90, slip op. at 9 (Navajo Dec. 12,
1990) (holding that the Act intended to define and separate powers of political branches);
NAvo Tams, Dec. 21, 1989, at 12, col. 2 (stating that Tribal Council approved reor-
ganization by 44-17 vote and discussing provisions); NAvAjo Thas, Dec. 7, 1989, at 1,
col. I (discussing provisions of proposed resolution).
183. See KucsAR, supra note 20, at 24-27.
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govern the making, interpretation and enforcement of promises. The
final two parts of this article examine the effectiveness with which the
Navajos have dealt with these pressures.
V. Dispute Resolution in the Navajo Nation
Although intermediate societies have adopted many of the practices
or structures of nontraditional societies, they typically have found
adoption of ideas, including legal norms, far more problematic. 1 4 One
scholar has even arrived at the 'law' of the non-transferability of
legal rules."' 85 Often, nontraditional laws are superimposed on tradi-
tional customs, and societies then struggle, generally unhappily, with
the coexistence of the old customs and the new laws. 18 6
The dine'd, however, have a history of successfully incorporating
elements of other cultures. They have demonstrated that same ability
in altering their dispute resolution mechanisms. Before 1950, disputes
generally were mediated in local communities, as discussed above.8 7
A rudimentary court system established and controlled by the federal
government provided the only alternative. Although traditional dispute
resolution continues, a greatly expanded judicial system funded and
controlled by the tribe now is the primary forum.' Moreover, the
tribal courts have established a third institution, peacemaker courts,
which mediate disputes in a traditional manner but are backed by the
power of the tribal courts. 8 9
These changes have not eliminated traditional Navajo influences.
Rather, Navajos have fused traditional customs with Anglo-American
concepts of dispute resolution to produce a unique system.' 90
A. Resolution by Mediation
Traditional mediated dispute resolution remains as a means of
resolving disputes between Navajos. 19' Recent developments have af-
fected it in at least three ways, however. First, Navajos use traditional
dispute resolution less, 92 and its use presumably will continue to decline
184. Id. at 27-28.
185. ROBERT B. SmmAN, THE STATE, LAW AND DsvEaoPmENT 37 (1978).
186. See Km=asA, supra note 20, at 46-72.
187. See supra notes 62-79 and accompanying text.
188. See infra notes 206-90 and accompanying text.
189. See infra notes 195-205 and accompanying text.
190. See Zion, supra note 4, at 92 (stating that the persistence of Navajo legal culture
along with the development of a legal system modeled after Anglo-American institutions
is one of many "illustrations of strong cultural survival complemented by a canny
pragmatism").
191. See Stephen Conn, Mid-Passage - The Navajo Tribe and its First Legal Revo-
lution, 6 Am. INDiAN L. Rsv. 329, 331 n.12.
192. Cadman Interview, supra note 63.
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to the extent that Navajos leave their rural communities and extended
families. 93 Second, lay advocates, a product of the Anglo-American
court system, now sometimes serve as mediators. 194 They presumably
bring some Anglo-American notions of justice with them. Finally, the
courts have created the peacemaker courts, which eventually may
become the primary means of resolving disputes by mediation in the
Navajo Nation.
Navajo jurists adopted the rules establishing the peacemaker courts
in 1982. Under the rules, local governments or judges select individuals
as peacemakers. The rules prescribe few procedures; by and large,
peacemakers mediate disputes using such techniques as they see fit.
The rules, however, specify that attorneys may not represent parties. 19s
The rules create four roles for the district courts in the peacemaking
process, which distinguish peacemaking from traditional Navajo dis-
pute resolution. First, district court judges may refer any civil or
criminal action to the peacemaker courts. Parties who are Navajo must
participate in the peacemaker sessions; non-Navajos may decline. If
the peacemaker proceedings fail to produce agreement, the parties may
return to the court system."" Second, the courts exercise supervisory
powers over the peacemakers, and may issue protective orders against
undue pressure to participate and compromise.197 Third, the courts
may subpoena witnesses to appear at peacemaker proceedings.198 Fi-
nally, any mediated outcome may be entered as a judgment and
accorded the same dignity as a judgment of the Navajo court system.199
These measures permit mediation to function even when the parties
are not members of the same community, reduce thd danger of un-
toward pressures to cooperate and compromise, and eliminate the
potential, although seldom realized, problem of enforcement of the
mediated result.21
Implementation of the peacemaker court system varies among the
seven judicial districts. The fourteen peacemakers in the district of
Judge Cadman, who has implemented the system more fully than any
193. See supra notes 51, 168-69 and accompanying text.
194. Corn, supra note 191, at 331 n.12.
195. See Zion, supra note 4, at 97-99, 102-03; JAMES ZION & NEisON MCABE, NAvAJo
PEACEWAKER CourT MANUAL: A GUIDE TO TmE USE OF THE NAvAJo PEAcEMAKE CouRT
FOR JUDGES, Comamuxry LEaDERs AN CouiRT PERSONNEL 8-9 (1982) [hereinafter MANUAL].
If the parties are unable to reach a mediated solution, they may agree to the peacemaker
acting as arbitrator. Id. at 9-10.
196. Zion, supra note 4, at 101-02, 104; MANUAL, supra note 195, at 7-8, 11.
197. Zion, supra note 4, at 100-01.
198. MANUAL, supra note 195, at 10-11.
199. See Zion, supra note 4, at 101; MANUAL, supra note 195, at 11.
200. See Zion, supra note 4, at 100-01. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text
(discussing extent to which those problems exist in the context of traditional mediation).
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other judge,20' vary widely in background,20 but follow certain similar
procedures: members of the extended families of the two primary
disputants attend peacemaking sessions, everyone is allowed to speak,
and the sessions often last for many hours until a consensus is reached.2 3
During the period from 1986 through 1990, Judge Cadman referred
about fifty-three cases to peacemakers. Of these, mediation failed to
resolve only two.2 This record suggests that the peacemaker courts
can effectively meld traditional methods and nontraditional powers
and protections.
With incomplete implementation of the system, however, the peace-
maker courts have played a relatively minor role in resolving disputes,
including contractual disputes. Moreover, even if the peacemaker court
system is fully implemented at some time in the future, Navajos will
need an alternative to mediation. At most, traditional mediation and
peacemaker courts can become the fora for contractual disputes be-
tween Navajos. Non-tribal members are not, and probably never will
be, compelled to participate in mediation sessions. Since World War
II, Navajos have increasingly done business with Anglo-Americans off
the reservation. 2 5 The judicial system must remain the primary forum
for resolving disputes arising out of those transactions.
B. Resolution by Adjudication
1. Creation of the Court System
In 1903, the federal government created an alternative to traditional
means of dispute resolution on the Navajo Reservation: Courts of
Indian Offenses. These courts had little real power. The judges were
Navajos appointed by federal officials, few if any of the judges had
formal legal education, they operated under rules promulgated by the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and government agents reviewed their
decisions. 6 The courts primarily resolved petty criminal matters,220
201. Interview with Edward Martin, Administrator of the Navajo Judicial System, in
Window Rock, Navajo Nation, Ariz. (May 10, 1991) [hereinaftqr Martin Interview].
202. They include a traditional Navajo who knows little English and a high school
teacher, a Christian pastor and a traditional Navajo singer. Cadman Interview, supra note
63.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 170-71.
206. See Tso, The Tribal Court Survives, supra note 4, at 25; see also BRAKFL, supra
note 4, at 10-11 (stating that on all reservations that had Courts of Indian Offenses, the
judges were appointed by and responsible to the federal government).
207. The federal government prosecuted major crimes in federal court. See infra text
accompanying note 222.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol18/iss1/2
NA VAJO DISPUTE RESOLUTION
and seldom resolved civil disputes. 2°1 Underfunding made even their
law and order role largely symbolic.20
The tribe replaced the bare-bones federal court system with a more
developed tribal system during the 1950s for several reasons. Intratribal
considerations partly motivated the action. A successful tribal court
system would strengthen the developing tribal government vis-d-vis the
communities by making it the provider of law-and-order and the
dispenser of justice. 210 Moreover, traditional dispute resolution could
not deal adequately with the law-and-order problems, often alcohol
related, posed by young adults. These individuals had weak community
ties, had lived off the reservation during World War II and had to
adapt to a wage-earning economy because of the inadequacy of the
range.211
External relations, however, were probably even a more important
spur to action. Navajo leaders feared that, if they did not have a legal
system modeled on Anglo-American law, the states would assume
jurisdiction on the reservation.2 12 The case of Williams v. Lee" high-
lighted the threat. A reservation trader sued a Navajo couple residing
on the reservation in Arizona state court to enforce a debt. The Arizona
Supreme Court upheld the state court's jurisdiction, 214 and the Navajos
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The Tribal Council decided that it was important to show the highest
Anglo court that its own court system offered a viable means of debt
collection. The council assumed all costs of law enforcement on the
reservation and created a new court system. The Chairman was given
the power to appoint the jurists - seven trial judges and a chief
justice. The court of appeals consisted of the chief justice and two
trial court judges called by the chief justice to serve on specific cases.
A jurist would serve until the age of seventy, subject to a two-year
probationary period.21 5
The Tribal Council's foresight proved accurate. The United States
Supreme Court reversed the state court judgment, holding that the
tribal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over the contract action when
both parties resided on the reservation.2 6 It stated: "The tribe itself
208. 3 Van Valkenburgh, supra note 67, at 43.
209. See Corn, supra note 191, at 334.
210. Id. at 340. See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text (discussing growth of
tribal government).
211. Corn, supra note 191, at 339. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text
(discussing changes in economy).
212. See IVERSON, supra note 45, at 74-75; Conn, supra note 191, at 338-40.
213. 358 U.S. 217 (1959), rev'g, 319 P.2d 998 (1958).
214. Williams v. Lee, 319 P.2d 998, 1001-02 (1958), rev'd, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
215. See IvERsoN, supra note 45, at 75-76; Conn, supra note 191, at 359-65; Tso, The
Tribal Court Survives, supra note 4, at 53.
216. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
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in recent years greatly improved its legal system through increased
expenditures and better trained personnel. Today [the courts] exercise
broad criminal and civil jurisdiction which covers suits by outsiders
against ]Indian defendants. ' '2I7
The basic structure of the Navajo judicial system established in the
late 1950s remained virtually intact until 1985.218 By that year's Judicial
Reform Act,2 19 the Tribal Council rewrote much of the code concerning
the legal branch, including replacing the court of appeals with a three-
member supreme courtYm The changes wrought by that act are still in
effect.
The mere fact that the Tribal Council created a judicial system
reveals almost nothing about its impact or acceptance. The courts'
jurisdiction provides one possible limitation on their influence. The
narrower the jurisdiction, the fewer people and issues the courts may
influence.
2. Jurisdiction
Navajo courts assert jurisdiction over disputes as broadly as per-
mitted by federal law. That law tightly constrains the jurisdiction of
all Native American courts over criminal prosecutions. It bars tribal
courts from exercising power over non-Indians who commit crimes on
the reservation.221 Federal law also gives federal courts jurisdiction over
thirteen specified felonies committed by a native defendant,m possibly
foreclosing tribal jurisdiction over the same offenses.22 Finally, it
prohibits tribes from imposing criminal penalties on their own members
in excess of one year and a $5000 fine.
FederaJl law imposes fewer restrictions on the civil jurisdiction of
tribal courts.225 As Williams v. Lee established, tribal courts have
217. Id. at 222; see Conn, supra note 191, at 354-63. The Supreme Court's decision
in Williams has been described as the opening of "the modern era of federal Indian law"
and as a "watershed." CHARES F. WILKINsoN, AmEiucA INDIANs, Tm AND TnE LAW:
NATrVE SOCIETEs IN A MODERN CONSTItTONAL DEmoCRACY 1 (1987).
218. In 1978, the Council created a Supreme Judicial Council, which was abolished in
1985. See infra notes 262-67 and accompanying text.
219. Re,;. CD-94-85 (codified at NAvAJo TRm. CODE CODE tit. 7 (Supp. 1984-85)).
220. NAvAjo TuB. CODE tit. 7, § 301 (Supp. 1984-85). See generally U.S. CoMM'N ON
Cv RIGH s, ENF oR E ENT OF THE INDIAN CrvI RIGHTs AcT: HEn ao HEW IN FiAG-
STAFF, ARIZoNA, AUGUST 13-14, 1987, at 111-16 [hereinafter 1 HEARING] (testimony of
Albert Hale, attorney, the principal author of the act).
221. Oliphant v. Suquanish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978). In 1990, the
United States Supreme Court also held that tribes could not exercise jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians who commit crimes on reservations. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676,
684-88 (1990). That decision and the congressional action it spawned to fill the jurisdictional
void it created are discussed below. See infra notes 253-59 and accompanying text.
222. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988).
223. Duro, 495 U.S. at 680 n.l.
224. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1988).
225. Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15 (1987).
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exclusive jurisdiction over civil claims against tribal members arising
on the reservation.? Also, federal law generally does not prevent tribal
courts from exercising jurisdiction over civil claims against nonmem-
bers arising from activities on a reservation.227 Jurisdiction in other
situations, such as a member's claim against a non-Indian arising from
a contract entered and allegedly breached off-reservation, is more
uncertain under federal law.? Regardless, as a matter of comity, if a
claim is filed in tribal court, a federal court must give that court the
first opportunity to determine its jurisdiction by requiring a non-Indian
defendant to exhaust all tribal remedies before the federal court reviews
the tribal court's jurisdictional determination. "2 9
Although federal law permits tribes to assert civil jurisdiction over
claims against nonmembers, many tribes have declined to extend their
courts' jurisdiction that far210 The dine'j have shown no such reluc-
tance. Broad exercise of jurisdiction expresses the power of the tribal
government over its members and asserts Navajo sovereignty vis-d-vis
other govermnents.23 Assertion of jurisdiction over disputes in which
one party is not a tribal member extends tribal court protection to
tribal members doing business off the reservation.
The Tribal Council has given Navajo courts jurisdiction over "all
civil actions in which the defendant is a resident of Navajo Indian
Country, or has caused an action to occur within the territorial juris-
diction of the Navajo Nation. ' '12 2 The only subjects excluded from the
jurisdictional grant are certain actions against the tribe itself.? 3 The
226. 358 U.S. at 223; see CoHEN, supra note 14, at 342 & n.106.
227. "Civil jurisdiction over such activities [activities of non-Indians on reservation
lands] presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty
provision or federal statute." LaPlante, 480 U.S. at 18. But see Twin City Constr. Co.
v. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, 866 F.2d 971, 972 (8th Cir. 1989) (court
divided 5-5 on whether tribal court had jurisdiction over breach of contract claim by
Indian subcontractor against non-Indian general contractor for work done on-reservation,
thereby reinstating district court decision that tribal court lacked jurisdiction).
228. See CoHEN, supra note 14, at 342, 354-57.
229. LaPlante, 480 U.S. at 15-16, 19; National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow
Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985).
230. VnwE DEmoRiA, JR. & Cur.roRD M. LYrL., AMEmcA INDANs, A.MMEcAN JusncE
210 (1983).
231. See, e.g., Sells v. Espil, No. A-CV-15-89, slip op. at 11 (Navajo Aug. 14, 1990)
("In the process of litigation [over which tribal courts have exercised jurisdiction], Navajo
law and Navajo sovereignty are strengthened"); Deal v. Blatchford, 3 Navajo Rptr. 159,
160 (Navajo 1982) ("the source of authority for tribal courts is the inherent sovereignty
of their respective tribes ... tribal court authority is coextensive with sovereignty of the
Indian nation itself").
232. NAvAjo Tim. CODE tit. 7, § 253 (Supp. 1984-85); see Plummer v. Brown, No.
A-CV-03-89, slip op. at 4-5 (Navajo Mar. 23, 1989).
233. Amendments to the Navajo Sovereign Immunity Act, Res. CMY-28-88 (May 6,
1988) (to be codified at NAvAJo TaRm. CODE tit. 1, § 351), cited in Plummer, No. A-CV-
03-89, slip op. at 5-10.
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courts' territorial jurisdiction extends outside the reservation to, in
many cases, land owned by non-Navajos.?
The courts' personal jurisdiction over defendants is similarly broad.
The tribal code authorizes "personal jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants to the extent allowed by Navajo due process." m Although
that due process protection arises under the Navajo Bill of Rights216
234. See Sandoval v. Tinian, Inc., 5 Navajo Rptr. 215, 218 (Navajo D. Ct. 1986)
(holding that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over claim against non-Navajo
arising partially or entirely on fee-owned land, because land was located within eastern
Navajo Agency and within a dependent Navajo Indian community).
235. Plummer, No. A-CV-03-89, slip op. at 6. The relevant code section was quoted
above. See supra text accompanying note 232.
236. Because the United States Constitution does not apply to native tribes, Talton v.
Mayes, 16.. U.S. 376, 384 (1896), Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA),
25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1988), in 1968 to require tribes to afford to their members many
of the individual rights guaranteed in the Constitution and Bill of Rights. Several protec-
tions, including those provided by the Establishment Clause and the second, third, and
seventh amendments, were excluded. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988); see CoheN, supra note 14,
at 666-70; DE.osu, & LYrL, supra note 230, at 126-30.
Like many tribes, the Navajo Nation opposed adoption of the ICRA, believing it to
be "an intrusion upon tribal sovereignty." The Navajo Tribal Council adopted the Navajo
Bill of Rights in 1967, Res. CO-63-67 (Oct. 9, 1967) (codified at NAvAjo TPrn. CODE tit.
1, §§ 1-8 (1977)), in part to try to forestall passage of the ICRA. See Bennett v. Navajo
Bd. of Election Supervisors, No. A-CV-26-90, slip op. at 7-8 (Navajo Dec. 12, 1990).
'After passage of the ICRA, individuals flooded the federal courts with suits against
tribes alleging violations of its provisions. The United States Supreme Court, however,
ended most of those suits by its decision in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49
(1978). It reasoned that tribes were protected against suits in federal court by their sovereign
immunity, unless Congress expressly limited or abrogated that immunity. The only federal
relief granted by the ICRA is by a writ of habeas corpus, which is available only in
instances of unlawful detention. Otherwise, tribal courts are the only possible avenue for
enforcement of alleged violations of the ICRA. Id. at 58-59, 69-70. Subsequently, the
Navajo Supreme Court held that the ICRA also did not explicitly authorize suits in tribal
courts, and that sovereign immunity bars claims under the ICRA in tribal courts as well.
See TBI Contractors, Inc. v. Tribe, No. A-CV-28-85, slip op. at 7-8 (Navajo Aug. 12,
1988).
About nineteen years after passage of the original Navajo Bill of Rights and about
two years before the Navajo Supreme Court decided that claims under the ICRA were
barred, the council rewrote and expanded the rights under the Navajo Bill of Rights. Res.
CD-59-1986 (Dec. 11, 1986) (to be codified at NAVAJO Tam. CODE tit. 1, §§ 1-9), reprinted
in U.S. COMM'N ON CivIL .RIGHTS, ENFORCEMENT oF THE INDIAN Crv RIoHTS ACT:
HEARING HELD IN FLAGSArF, ARmZONA, Juay 20, 1988, at 145-46 [hereinafter 2 Hearing];
see Bennett, No. A-CV-26-90, slip op. at 8-9 (discussing amendment). The tribal law now
includes almost all of the rights in the federal Bill of Rights (the only two excluded are
the protection against forced quartering of troops and the right to presentment or indict-
ment of a grand jury), modifies some (the right to bear arms is "for peaceful purposes"),
and adds others (sex equality and rights to the benefits of membership in the tribe). See
2 HEARING, supra, at 145-46. The tribal law also guarantees rights not protected by the
ICRA, including appointment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants. Cf. 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1302-1303 (1988).
The Navajo courts have only limited power to award monetary compensation for
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instead of the due process clauses in the amendments to the United
States Constitution,237 the Navajo Supreme Court uses a minimum
contacts analysis consistent with that employed by the United States
Supreme Court to determine whether a tribal court's exercise of juris-
diction is appropriate.28 Under this type of analysis, Navajo courts
are likely to assert personal jurisdiction over all tribal members who
are sued for breach of a contract, and over non-tribal members when
the plaintiff resides on the reservation or the performance contemplated
in the contract would occur partly on the reservation or affect the
reservation's resources or people. Unlike traditional mediators and
peacemakers, therefore, tribal courts routinely resolve disputes arising
out of broken promises when only one of the parties is a tribal member:
Simply asserting jurisdiction over transactional disputes, however,
does not satisfy the Tribal Council's purposes in creating the court
system. Aggrieved parties must file actions in the Navajo tribal courts
for broad assertions of jurisdiction to make any difference. This will
not happen unless aggrieved parties have confidence in the courts.
The lack of on-reservation business makes it especially important
for the Navajo judicial system to instill confidence in off-reservation
businesspeople. Business confidence in a legal system stems largely
from the predictability of its decisions. 2 9 Merchants, like any people
making decisions requiring forecasts of the behavior of others, require
universal rules that are applied consistently. The goal of consistent
application of universal rules is one of the distinguishing characteristics
of nontraditional legal systems.m The last two sections of part V
discuss two issues related to the consistent application of legal rules.
Part VI analyzes the Navajo rules related to promissory disputes.
violation of the Navajo Bill of Rights, see Plummer, No. A-CV-03-89, slip op. at 18-21,
but full authority to award declaratory, mandamus or injunctive relief. NAvAJo TRm.
CODE tit. 1, § 354(g) (Supp. 1984-85) (to be recodified as § 354(f)).
237. U.S. CoNsT. amends. V, XIV.
238. See Sells v. Espil, No. A-CV-15-89, slip op. at 7-11 (Navajo Aug. 14, 1990)
(holding that although there may not have been many contacts, when the plaintiffs, both
of whom were nonresidents and one of whom was a tribal member, contracted to provide
brokerage services to the defendant nonresident Anglo-Americans in connection with the
sale of land to the tribe, and when each of the defendants made at least one trip to the
reservation in connection with the sale, sufficient contacts had occurred for the district
court to have jurisdiction over the defendants).
239. See Trubek, supra note 21, at 6-7, 13.
240. See id. at 11-15 (describing Weber's theories concerning Western legal systems
and their role in the development of capitalism). Obviously, courts may fall short of the
goal, but many traditional societies have few if any universal rules and no means of
obtaining consistent application of those rules which do exist.
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1993
42 AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW [Vol. 18
3. Training and Education
In 1959, few Navajo advocates or judges had any legal training.2'
If that were still true, businesspeople would have little confidence in
the system.
Even today, few Navajos have completed law school. Two legal aid
services242 founded during the 1960s, however, provided systematic
training for non-lawyers, called advocates. Advocates' improved ad-
vocacy required the judges in turn to learn more Anglo-American
law.24
3
Practice in the Navajo courts now requires membership in the
Navajo Nation Bar Association and passage of the Navajo bar ex-
amination. To sit for the bar examination, a candidate must be a
member of a state bar or, if a Navajo, must have graduated from a.
law school or a certified Navajo bar training course or served at least
a six-month apprenticeship. 2" The bar exam has become much more
difficult over the last two decades, and the passage rate of new
advocates is declining. 45
The background and training of the jurists have changed in a similar
direction. The Judicial Reform Act of 1985 spelled out qualifications
for judicial appointment, including at least two years' work experience
in a law-related area.Y One associate justice and one district court
judge have law degrees, 247 and many of the jurists had lengthy expe-
rience as advocates before appointment.24 8 After Tom Tso became
241. In the early 1950s, the tribe had only one law school graduate, and he was a
government employee, not a judge or practitioner before the courts. Conn, supra note
191, at 343 & n.105.
242. One of them, Dinebelina Nahiilna Be Agaditahe (DNA), which roughly translated
means "Lawyers for the Development of the People," Richard P. Fahey, Native American
Justice: The Courts of the Navajo Nation, JuDicATuRE, June-July 1975, at 10, 15, played
an especially important role in the development of Navajo law and in representing Navajos
in the local state and federal courts. See IvESoN, supra note 45, at 92-95.
243. See Fahey, supra note 242, at 15; Tso, Decision Making in Tribal Courts, supra
note 4, at 231.
244. See Tso, Decision Making in Tribal Courts, supra note 4, at 229; Tso, The Tribal
Court Survives, supra note 4, at 54.
245. Cadman Interview, supra note 63. Judges and attorneys generally praise the work
of advocates, although not unreservedly. See id. (stating it is uncertain whether attorneys
have an advantage; generally, practitioners are more aware of Navajo tradition than Anglo-
American attorneys, but attorneys have an advantage in technical cases); Interview with
William P. Battles, Attorney, in Window Rock, Navajo Nation, Ariz. (May 15, 1991)
[hereinafter Battles Interview] (stating that many lay advocates are better trial advocates
than are some of the attorneys); Lally Interview, supra note 13 (stating that advocates are
of mixed quality; the work of some is equivalent to attorneys, others do inferior work).
246. NvAJo TRm. CODE tit. 7, § 354(4) (Supp. 1984-85).
247. Telephone Interview with Edward Martin, Administrator of the Navajo Nation
Judicial Branch (July 2, 1991) (stating that Justice Austin and Judge Yazzie have graduated
from law schools).
248. For example, recently retired Chief Justice Tom Tso acted as an advocate for
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chief justice in 1985,249 the quality of the judiciary has improved
markedly. He instituted or formalized programs of sending new ap-
pointees to training sessions, providing continuing education oppor-
tunities for all jurists, and conducting annual evaluations of all district
court judges, whether or not they had probationary status.2 0 The
educational background of the Navajo practitioners and judges cer-
tainly does not match, and their training may not match, that of
lawyers and judges in local state and federal courts, but the gap is
narrowing.
The improved training and education of the Navajo professionals,
however, does not mean loss of their traditional beliefs. 21 For example,
they may retain their pragmatic orientation, 2 2 as shown by the outrage
which Navajo jurists expressed over the United States Supreme Court
decision in Duro v. Reina.23 In Duro the Court held that Congress
had not intended for tribal courts to have criminal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians who commit crimes on Indian reservations, 254
despite the Court's uncertainty over whether either state or federal
courts have jurisdiction over most such crimes. The issues of state and
federal court jurisdiction were not before the Court; therefore, it
refused to address the possible jurisdictional void.25
Whereas the United States Supreme Court dissenters argued that
the majority erred in its .interpretations of congressional intent and
prior precedents, 2 6 Navajo jurists took a much more pragmatic ap-
eleven years before being appointed the judge for the Window Rock District in 1981 and
the Chief Justice in 1985, NAvAJo T)ms TODAY, Oct. 15, 1985, p. 1, col. 2, and Judge
Wayne Cadman worked as an advocate and prosecutor for twelve years before being
appointed the judge of the Chinle District in 1985. Cadman Interview, supra note 63.
249. See NAvAJo Tas TODAY, Oct. 15, 1985, at 1, col. 2.
250. See Tso, Decision Making in Tribal Courts, supra note 4, at 229; Tso, The Tribal
Court Survives, supra note 4, at 53-54.
251. But see Conn, supra note 191, at 369 (stating that as Navajo legal specialists
have become professionalized, they also have become relatively immune from pressures
from the community).
252. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (pragmatic nature of Navajo
socioreligious beliefs). See infra notes 339-40 and accompanying text (manifestation of
pragmatic orientation in transactional law disputes).
253. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
254. Id. at 684-88.
255. Id. at 696-98. The dissenters argued that the existence of a void was directly
relevant, because Congress probably did not intend to create a void in which no sovereign
could exercise power. If, as they believed, state and federal courts lacked jurisdiction over
minor crimes committed by nonmember Indians, then Congress must have intended tribes
to exercise jurisdiction. Id. at 705-06 & n.3 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 698. Justices Brennan and Marshall presented a stronger doctrinal argument
than did the majority. The majority relied primarily on the Court's prior holding in
Oliphant v. Suquaniish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), that tribes lacked criminal
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proach. Many nonmember Indians reside on the Navajo and other
reservations,2 7 and the decision created a law enforcement nightmare.
The Navajos wondered how the high court could hand down a decision
with no apparent concern about the practical consequences.28 Tribal
leaders, including Navajo jurists, expressed their outrage to Congress,
which responded by passing legislation allowing tribal courts to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.259
4. Judicial Independence
Since the 1950s, Navajo political leaders have realized that the
perception that the judiciary is independent of the political branches
and the electorate would help to instill confidence in Anglo-Ameri-
cans. 6 If judges followed the dictates of the political branches or the
electorate when a contractual dispute arose, businesspeople could not
feel confident in a predictable result. Accordingly, the council provided
in 1959 for permanent tenure (until retirement age) for jurists, subject
to a two-year probationary period, instead of making the positions
subject to reelection or reappointment. 261
Despite the provision for permanent appointment, in its early years,
the court system was clearly subordinate to the other branches of
jurisdiction over non-natives, and on its prior reasoning in United States v. Wheeler, 435
U.S. 313 (1978), permitting a tribe and the United States to prosecute a tribal member
for the same offense without offending the double jeopardy clause. Duro, 495 U.S. at
684-90. The dissenters pointed out that both of those decisions rested on interpretations
of congressional acts, and that a series of acts indicated a congressional intent to treat
non-natives differently than nonmember Indians for purposes of a tribe's criminal juris-
diction. Id. at 700-06.
257. The Navajo Nation estimated in 1989 that over 11,000 nonmembers resided within
its territorial jurisdiction. NAVAJO NAToIN REPORT, supra note 9, at 4. A large percentage
are probably nonmember Indians as opposed to other Americans.
258. Interview with Justices (Tso, Austin, Bluehouse), supra note 66; Cadman Inter-
view, supr note 63.
259. Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 646
(making permanent the one-year amendment of 25 U.S.C. § 1301 effected by Act of Nov.
5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (101 Stat.) 1856, 1892-93).
260. See IvERsON, supra note 45, at 76. When considering the resolution that created
the Navajc. judicial system council, members recognized that "[it is very important that
politics not play a part in our judicial system or in any way influence them to make
decisions." Id. (quoting from minutes of debate).
261. See supra text accompanying note 215. The decision not to subject jurists to
reelection or reappointment is applauded to this day. See Battles Interview, supra note
245 (stating that a major reason that Navajo courts are superior to other tribal courts is
that the judges receive life-time appointments, thereby removing much of the political
influence); cf. DE.o iA & LYTLE, supra note 230, at 137 (stating that many native judges
do not possess the independence of Anglo-American judges: they are appointed and serve
at the pleasure of political leaders, and "[c]omplaints of political interference are com-
monplace and recalls and impeachments are not infrequent").
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government. Jurists, perhaps accustomed to BIA review of their de-
cisions,262 frequently asked the Tribal Chairman or his aides how they
should rule in particular cases.
26 3
In the late 1970s, the political branches quashed the judiciary's
initial attempts to achieve autonomy and treatment as a coequal branch
of government. The Court of Appeals handed down three controversial
decisions in quick succession.26 Two invalidated highly publicized and
politicized Tribal Council actions despite the lack of a written consti-
tution that the actions could have violated,26 and the third held that
the executive department could not dismiss an employee of the judicial
branch. 266
On May 4, 1978, the Tribal Council responded by creating the
Supreme Judicial Council, consisting of five council members and
three judges.267 It was empowered "to hear challenges of Navajo Court
of Appeals rulings regarding the validity of any action of the Tribal
Council or its advisory committee"26" and the council retained the
"ultimate authority to overturn a decision of the Supreme Judicial
262. See supra text accompanying note 206.
263. Battles Interview, supra note 245.
264. See generally Iv-EsoN, supra note 45, at 208-11; Ziontz, supra note 4, at 18-23.
265. See Yazzie v. Navajo Tribal Bd. of Elections, 1 Navajo Rptr. 213, 217 (Navajo
1978) (rejecting council's redistricting plan which "may have satisfied minimum federal
requirements but in no way ... satisf[ied] the unique requirements of the Navajo
electorate"); Halona v. MacDonald, 1 Navajo Rptr. 189 (Navajo 1978) (invalidating
council's decision to pay the legal fees of F. Lee Bailey, who had successfully defended
MacDonald against federal charges of misappropriation of funds, because the council had
violated due process by ignoring its own preexisting procedural rules).
266. Gudac v. Marianito, 1 Navajo Rptr. 385 (Navajo 1978). Under Anglo-American
standards, each decision rested on shaky legal ground. In Halona, the Court of Appeals
grounded its right of judicial review on violation of the due process guarantee in the
federal Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1988). See Halona, 1 Navajo Rptr.
at 209. The court did not adequately explain, however, why the council's failure to follow
its own earlier-adopted procedural rule amounted to a violation of due process. See Ziontz,
supra note 4, at 20-22.
The court could not even rely on the federal act in Yazzie, because it acknowledged
that the council's reapportionment plan may have satisfied federal standards. Yazzie, I
Navajo Rptr. at 217. It appeared merely to be substituting its own political judgment for
the council's. Id. ("Any plan adopted for the Navajo Nation must take into account
chapter boundaries, agency boundaries, district grazing boundaries and other geographic
symbols of the traditional clan relationship of the Navajo people.").
Finally, Gudac did not consider that the Tribal Council had created the court system.
Presumably, with the power to create went the power to determine who set the terms for
employment of judicial branch employees.
267. Ziontz, supra note 4, at 24; see also 1 HE.Awo, supra note 220, at 71 (testimony
of Peter Iverson) (stating that Yazzie was a significant factor in the creation of the Supreme
Judicial Council); id. at 85-86 (testimony of Richard Hughes) (stating that Halona "led
almost directly" to the creation of the Supreme Judicial Council).
268. Ziontz, supra note 4, at 24.
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Council."2 9 Later in 1978, Chairman Peter MacDonald discharged the
trial judges who had decided Halona and Yazzie, both of whom were
still on probationary status. 270 Finally, in 1979, MacDonald named
Nelson McCabe, a former council member and political ally, as acting
chief justice.27'
These measures apparently succeeded. The Supreme Judicial Council
did not meet after 1979,272 apparently because there was no need. The
courts did not assert the right of judicial review of council action
again for over ten years.
In 1978, MacDonald had controlled the executive and legislative
branches. 273 The political situation had changed dramatically by 1989,
when the Navajos' highest court again championed the judiciary's
autonomy and right to review the actions of the political branches.
Early in the year, the crisis following the exposure of MacDonald's
bribery and kickback schemes erupted. 274 Time and again, MacDonald
and the council, the majority of whose members had turned against
him, looked to the tribal courts, and ultimately to the Navajo Supreme
Court, to determine their rights.275 The Navajo Supreme Court even-
269. Id. (quoting Res. CMY-39-78 (May 4, 1978)).
270. See I HEARiNG, supra note 220, at 89-91 (testimony of Richard Hughes); id. at
97-98 (testimony of former Judge Merwin Lynch); id. at 109 (written statement of attorney
Eric Eberhard).
271. Id. at 124 (testimony of Daniel Deschinny, Navajo lay advocate and representative
of McCabe); see also Battles Interview, supra note 245 (stating that McCabe was a political
flunky).
272. See 2 HEAPiNG, supra note 236, at 59 (written testimony of current Chairman
Peterson Zah). During the less than two years in which it was active, the Supreme Judicial
Council heard only about three cases. 1 HEAssuo, supra note 220, at 112 (testimony of
Albert Hale, attorney).
273. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text (discussing power of Chairman
and MacDonald's charisma).
274. See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text (discussing MacDonald's suspension
as Chairman and conviction on criminal charges).
275. The various judicial decisions are far too numerous, and the surrounding events
far too complicated, to discuss in this article. The initial court decisions, however, are
illustrative.
After the Tribal Council placed MacDonald on administrative leave on February 17,
1989, A Tribe at War; Amid Charges of Graft, a Battle for Chiefdom Wounds Navajo
Tradition, Cm. Tam., Mar. 27, 1989, at § 5, at 4, he filed an action to enjoin enforcement
of the resolution on February 21. The judge of the Kayenta District Court, the brother-
in-law of MacDonald's wife, granted a temporary restraining order that day. See Plummer
v. Brown, No. A-CV-03-89, slip op. at 2 (Navajo Mar. 23, 1989); Navajo Leader Out of
Power, Aiuz. REPuBLic, Feb. 25, 1989, at Bi. On March 2, the supreme court vacated
the restraining order, dismissed the suit under the Navajo Sovereign Immunity Act as
involving an action against the Navajo Nation, and prohibited the trial judge from presiding
over any other proceeding in which MacDonald had an interest. Plummer, No. A-CV-03-
89, slip op. at 2-3, 5-10.
MacDonald, however, refused to submit to administrative leave, contending that the
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tually ruled that the Chairman's authority was derived from the Tribal
Council, not from the electorate, as MacDonald had argued, and that
the council could withdraw or limit that authority, even to the extent
of placing MacDonald on administrative leave. 276
Perhaps emboldened by the deference paid to it during the crisis,
the Navajo Supreme Court handed down two decisions designed to
bolster the judiciary's autonomy and authority. First, it creatively
reinterpreted relevant provisions of the tribal code to eliminate a Tribal
Chairman's discretionary power over probationary judges. The su-
preme court's interpretation gave the central role in deciding whether
a probationary judge should be made permanent to the Judiciary
Committee of the Tribal Council in conjunction with the chief jus-
tice. 277
Second, the Navajo Supreme Court again expressly asserted the
right of judicial review of council actions,278 the same assertion which
had caused the political branches to rein in the courts in 1978.279 This
time, however, the court found firmer legal footing. It held that the
council lacked the power. Navajos Ask Ruling on Leader; Tribal High Court May Decide
Today, Amuz. RPumuc, Mar. 1, 1989, at B1. The Attorney General's office, which
supported the Tribal Council's position, filed an action in the Window Rock District Court
to enforce the resolution. MacDonald petitioned the supreme court to block the district
court from considering the action, arguing that the Navajo Sovereign Immunity Act
precluded jurisdiction, just as it had barred jurisdiction over his suit against the Tribal
Council. MacDonald v. Yazzie, No. A-CV-08-89, slip op. at 2 (Navajo Mar. 24, 1989).
The supreme court disagreed. Whereas MacDonald's suit had been against council members
performing their authorized legislative functions, the complaint filed against MacDonald
alleged that MacDonald was continuing to perform duties over which he had been stripped
of authority. The former was against council members acting in their official capacities;
the latter against an official allegedly acting ultra vires. Id. at 3.
276. Navajo Nation v. MacDonald (In re Certified Questions II), No. A-CV-13-89,
slip op. at 20-23 (Navajo Apr. 13, 1989).
277. See id., slip op. at 3-10. Under the code, the Chief Justice recommends to the
Judiciary Committee whether a probationary judge should be retained, and then the
Judiciary Committee makes its recommendation to the Chairman. The code provides that
if the Judiciary Committee recommends that a probationary judge be terminated, the
Chairman "may" do so. The decision reinterpreted "may" to mean "shall." Id., slip op.
at 3-5. The code also provides that once the Judiciary Committee has recommended
whether to make a probationary judge permanent, "the Chairman, at his discretion, may
appoint any judges recommended by the Judiciary Committee to permanent positions."
NAvAjo Tam. CODE tit. 7, § 355(d) (Supp. 1984-85), quoted in MacDonald, No. A-CV-
13-89, slip op. at 5. The court stated that this meant that the Chairman could disclose
his reasons for recommending against appointment to the Tribal Council, but if the council
followed the recommendation of its Judiciary Committee, the Chairman could not refuse
to appoint. Id., slip op. at 7-10.
278. See Bennett v. Navajo Bd. of Election Supervisors, No. A-CV-26-90 (Navajo
Dec. 12, 1990).
279. See supra notes 264-72 and accompanying text.
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Tribal Council intended certain organic acts, including the Navajo
Nation Bill of Rights,280 to have precedence over conflicting laws, even
if the conflicting laws were passed subsequently.28 Having grounded
judicial review in these acts, the Navajo Supreme Court then held that
the requirement that a candidate for President or Vice President
"[m]ust have served in an elected Navajo tribal office ... or must
have been employed within the Navajo tribal organization" violated
the rights embodied in the Navajo Nation Bill of Rights to due process
and equal protection.282
These two recent decisions have not provoked a strong adverse
reaction. Apparently, the courts, at least for the indefinite future, have
won their independence.
This independence is not a victory for the Anglo-American principle
of sepairation of powers. In trying to formulate a convincing argument
for judicial independence and the right of judicial review, the Navajo
courts have not been able to draw heavily on either Navajo or Anglo-
American traditions. The dine'd traditionally did not have an inde-
pendent. judiciary; the naat'aanii acted as both political leaders and
mediators of disputes.2 3 Many tribes, possibly with similar traditions,
still have little if any separation between their political and judicial
bodies.284 Constitutional governments do not provide a more useful
model, because the constitution is invoked as the basis for autonomy
and judicial review.n ' The Navajos also have not followed the British
courts which, in the absence of a written constitution, do not assert
the power of judicial review over acts of Parliament.28' Instead, the
Navajo Supreme Court has fashioned its own rationale for review,
280. See supra note 236.
281. Bennett, No. A-CV-26-90, slip op. at 10-11.
282. /d., slip op. at 13-19 (due process); id., slip op. at 20-22 (equal protection).
283. See supra text accompanying notes 59, 64. This has not prevented the courts
from engaging in revisionist history:
Our right to pass upon the legality or meaning of these actions has been
questioned in certain places but never by the Council or its Chairman. That
is because they have a traditional and abiding nespect for the impartial
adjudicatory process. When all have been heard and the decision is made,
it is respected. This has been the Navajo way since before the time of the
present judicial system. The Navajo people did not learnthis principle from
the white man. They have carried it with them throughout history.
The style and the form of problem-solving and dispensing justice has changed
over the years but not the principle. Those appointed by the People to
resolve their disputes were and are unquestioned in their power to do so.
Halona v. MacDonald, 1 Navajo Rptr. 189, 205-06 (1978).
284. See Brown v. Rice, 760 F. Supp. 1459, 1460 (D. Kan. 1991) (stating that the
Tribal Council for the Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians is also the tribe's court and
executive); Brandfon, Tradition and Judicial Review, supra note 4, at 106-07.
285. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-80 (1803).
286. See, e.g., Ziontz, supra note 4, at 16.
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which gains support from the recent events demonstrating the impor-
tance of a strong and independent judiciary.
C. Evaluation of Navajo Dispute Resolution
As a strategy for incorporating elements of foreign dispute resolution
while preserving important components of their own, the Navajos have
established two systems of dispute resolution. In one, disputes between
Navajos are resolved by mediation, whether through traditional means
or in the peacemaker courts. In the other, open to both intratribal
disputes and disputes in which at least one party is not a tribal member,
disputes are resolved through litigation.
Offering two alternative types of dispute resolution does not guar-
antee that Navajo dispute resolution is effective. In many traditional
societies, the great majority of the populace rejects efforts to impose
foreign judicial systems or rules. Any attempt to enforce the novel
rules, whether by traditional or nontraditional institutions of formal
dispute resolution, often results in the break down. 7
No statistics are available to determine whether Navajos on the
whole are pleased with mediation-based dispute resolution, although
the record of the peacemaker courts in Judge Cadman's district sug-
gests that those who use it emerge reasonably content. Because the
dine's have not attempted to impose nontraditional laws in traditional
dispute resolution, and because no person is forced to mediate before
a community leader, those who choose to resolve disputes in the
traditional manner almost certainly believe that it works. Peacemaker
courts will remain a relatively unimportant means of resolving disputes,
however, until they are established throughout the Navajo Nation.
Whereas no data show the level of Navajo satisfaction with medi-
ation-based dispute resolution, a study completed in 1990 by a federal
judge and an academic concluded that Navajos give high marks to
their court system. Although Navajos engaged in "healthy debate"
over individual issues, "no Navajo interviewed by the task force
condemned the system as it exists today."'-8
Attorneys who are familiar with Navajo and non-Navajo courts
generally agree with the conclusions of the populace. They unanimously
state that the quality of justice rendered in the Navajo courts has
improved tremendously during the 1970s and especially the 1980s. 289
287. See Ku1LcskR, supra note 20, at 144-45.
288. NAVAJO Tmas, July 19, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
289. See 1 HEARN G, supra note 220, at 83 (testimony of Richard Hughes, former
director, Dinebefina Nahilna Be Agaditahe (DNA) (stating that during the 1970s, "the
quality of the Navajo judiciary and the Navajo justice system overall improved enor-
mously"); Battles Interview, supra note 245 (stating that when he started practicing in the
Navajo courts 16 years ago, it was barely a legal system; now it is a strong institution
No. 1]
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They disagree on whether the tribal system provides a level of justice
equivalent to Arizona and New Mexico state courts; 29 any comparison,
however, may be meaningless, considering the different needs of the
state and tribal systems. The important point is that the Navajo court
system has made tremendous strides in a little more than thirty years,
and, as a still-novel institution, will probably continue to improve,
regardless of the measuring stick used.
VI. Promissory Liability in the Navajo Nation
In addition to its means of dispute resolution, a legal system is
judged by the substantive laws or customs which govern behavior.
Navajo leaders believe that they must create an environment favorable
to non-Navajo businesspeople, while maintaining sufficient protections
against exploitation. Effective promissory laws and customs must help
to achieve these goals. This part of the article analyzes these laws and
customs.
Of course, well-crafted contract or commercial laws are insufficient
by themselves to achieve the goals of the leadership. The Navajo
Nation faces many obstacles to development. Some obstacles are non-
governmental, including attitudes that inhibit capital accumulation
among Navajos.211 Others could be corrected, at least in part, by the
Tribal Council. It needs to improve education, allow commercial en-
terprises to acquire secure real estate interests that could be mortgaged
to lende:rs,29 streamline procedures for obtaining the permits necessary
helping to hold the tribe together); Hynes Interview, supra note 17 (stating that when he
started practicing in the early 1970s, there was "not much organization, not much training,
it was purely a political job and it has improved substantially since then"; Justices Tso
and Austin have "brought a lot to the bench as far as the ability to write decisions");
Lally Interview, supra note 13 (stating that the quality of the judicial system has improved
tremendously since 1978, especially since Tso became chief justice); Mason Interview,
supra note 109 (stating that the quality of the judicial system and judges has improved
substantially over the last ten years).
290. Compare I HEANo, supra note 220, at 83 (Hughes testimony) ("[Iun many of
the Navajo courts on the reservation one could have as good a hearing of an important
or complex, case as one could expect to get in the average State court in New Mexico.")
and id. at 103 (written testimony of Eric Eberhard) ("mhe courts of the Navajo Nation
are as competent as or more competent than the New Mexico state courts on a case-by-
case basis") with id. at 167-68 (testimony of attorney Larry Yazzie) (stating that judges
do not have adequate training) and Hynes Interview, supra note 17 (stating that although
the quality of the supreme court justices has improved tremendously, the quality of the
district court judges remains very uneven).
291. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
292. See GIBREATH, supra note 51, at 60, 73; Mason Interview, supra note 109 (stating
that the only real estate lien that a lender can obtain is on the commercial borrower's
tenant's interest (because the tribe owns the land), and lenders place little value on a
leasehold mortgage).
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to open a business on the reservation, 293 and expand the waiver of
sovereign immunity. The present exceptions to the immunity are not
generally applicable to breach of contract actions against the govern-
ment.294 Because the tribal government plays such a major role in the
economy and beneficially owns so many assets, including all the land
of the reservation, sovereign immunity poses a major obstacle to
business development. 291
A. Traditional Promissory Customs
Navajo customs applicable to disputes over broken promises were
discussed above.2" Regardless of how well those customs work to
regulate intratribal transactions, merchants would find them totally
293. See Shapiro, supra note 15, at 26 (describing businessman who was able to obtain
loan for off-reservation business in 30 minutes but who has been struggling for six years
to obtain all approvals and guarantees to build a fast-food restaurant on the reservation);
NAvAJO Twss TODAY, Oct. 2, 1985, at 1, col. 4 (stating that current commercial lease
approval process takes 2-10 years).
294. NAvAjO TRm. CODE tit. 1, § 354(b), (c), (f) (Supp. 1984-85). The only exceptions
possibly relevant to breach of contract actions are for actions explicitly authorized by
federal or tribal law and those covered by the tribe's liability insurance. No general law
authorizes breach of contract actions against the tribe, see TBI Contractors, Inc. v. Navajo
Tribe, No. A-CV-28-85, slip op. at 7-9 (Navajo Aug. 12, 1988), and the tribe has not
been covered by liability insurance against breach of contract actions. See TBI Contractors,
Inc. v. Navajo Tribe, No. A-CV-28-85 (Navajo Aug. 12, 1988); 1 HEauRiG, supra note
220, at 150-51, 155-57 (testimony of attorney Robert Wilson) (stating that managers of
arts and crafts trading post were barred by sovereign immunity from bringing breach of
contract claim against the tribe arising out of events occurring in early 1983, and when
the tribe sued them for breach of contract and tort, they could not assert a counterclaim
for breach of contract); Hynes Interview, supra note 17 (stating that tribe breached
construction management contract with his client and asserted sovereign immunity as a
defense against threatened lawsuit, placing his client "in a bad, bad bargaining position").
295. The Navajo Supreme Court has joined the chorus of voices urging the Tribal
Council to waive sovereign immunity for contract disputes because of the effect on
development. While ruling against a contractor's claim against the Navajo Nation because
of sovereign immunity, the court stated:
One of the most severe problems facing the Navajo Nation is that of
unemployment caused by the lack of economic development within the
Navajo Nation. One path in which the Navajo Nation may strengthen its
economic base is by drawing companies onto Navajo Indian Country. If the
Navajo Nation is to compete with the states for industrial and business
contracts, the Navajo Tribal Council must allow for contractual waivers of
the tribe's immunity from suit. The Navajo Tribal Council may achieve this
contractual waiver of immunity from suit through an amendment to the
Navajo Sovereign Immunity Act, or through the inclusion of individual
waivers written into each contract. The Navajo Nation must realize that
private corporations will not choose Navajo Indian Country to do business
on, unless they know that they will have a forum in which they will receive
a fair hearing in the event of a contract dispute.
TBI Contractors, No. A-CV-28-85, slip op. at 12.
296. See supra notes 88-103 and accompanying text.
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unacceptable. The absence of defined rules would make it difficult for
merchants to predict the outcomes of disputes with sufficient certainty.
The Navajo courts, therefore, cannot simply incorporate traditional
customs in deciding promissory disputes if they wish to encourage
business with Navajos.
B. Transactional Law in the Courts
The Navajo tribal courts instead have adopted an Anglo-American
model of transactional (contract, commercial, and consumer) law, with
relatively few incorporations of traditional promissory law. The first
subsection below discusses the reasons for the adoption of Anglo-
American transactional law, the second the extent to which traditional
Navajo principles remain, and the final subsection a possible modifi-
cation of the Navajo Nation's transactional laws, designed to accom-
modate traditional promissory customs in the courts.
1. Reasons Behind Adoption of Anglo-American Transactional
Law
Since the tribal courts came into existence, the tribal code has
directed that courts choose from the possible sources of substantive
law in the following order of priority: applicable federal law, tribal
statutory law, tribal customs, and last, if the courts elect, the laws of
the state in which the dispute arises. 297 When no statute controls,
selection of the substantive law to be applied to a particular dispute
forces Navajo courts to choose whether to adopt a Navajo custom as
a rule of law. The same type of choice frequently faces courts of all
intermediate nations. 298
Despite the tribal code's source of law provision, court advisors,
almost all Anglo-American, discouraged judges from looking to Navajo
customs to decide cases during the courts' early years. 299 As a result,
297. NAVAJO Tam. CODE tit. 7, § 204 (1977 & Supp. 1984-85).
298. KULCsAR, supra note 20, at 109-17.
299. One author wrote:
The codification and enunciation of custom as law was given lip service
but not meaningful encouragement. Judicial advisors and tribal attorneys
instead retreated to encouragement of informality at stages of litigation that
the advisors apparently thought would allow the tribal court to implement
traditional Navajo ways, concepts of harmonization that the advisors had
heard about....
It seems fair to say that Navajo leaders were badly advised in their
wholesale acceptance of Anglo-American common law. Clearly, they have
not been shown the opportunities available to them to change that substantive
law to meet expectations of Navajo people that were still relevant to them
on a day-to-day basis. The theme enunciated at the judicial training sessions
and the portrayal of white law as the law had clearly the contradictory effect
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the early reported decisions contain few references to Navajo customs.
That is no longer true. The reported decisions reflect an increasing
use of customs during the 1980s, in almost all fields of law. The courts
have relied on Navajo customs in establishing the Navajo common
law concerning many, probably most, family law issues. °° In the tort
area, the courts have permitted wrongful death actions and adopted
comparative negligence principles by extrapolating these doctrines from
traditional practices.30' Property interests frequently derive from tra-
ditional customs. 3°2 During the process, customs are transformed into
common law, as happened in England centuries ago. 30 3 By endorsing
the customs as law, tribal courts help to preserve tribal cultures and
values against "the ever-encroaching norms and procedures of the
dominant (white) majority. ' '304
of convincing sincere and perceptive Navajo leaders that acceptance of Anglo-
American substantive law was a requisite to maintenance of Tribal inde-
pendence from intrusion of the state and federal systems.
I VicmN, supra note 89, at 182-83, 184-85, quoted in Conn, supra note 190, at 211.
300. See Brandfon, Tradition and Judicial Review, supra note 4, at 1009 nn.109-12
(citing four decisions of the Navajo Supreme Court from the 1980s applying Navajo
customs to family law matters).
301. See Cadman v. Hubbard, 5 Navajo Rptr. 226 (Navajo D. Ct. 1986) (adopting
"pure" comparative fault doctrine by interpreting code language and referring to traditional
idea of compensating victims for loss); Benally v. Navajo Nation, 5 Navajo Rptr. 209
(Navajo D. Ct. 1986) (applying the traditional doctrine of restitution when a Navajo
accidentally kills another to require full compensation in the event of wrongful death).
302. See, e.g., Hood v. Bordy, No. A-CV-07-90, slip op. at 11-12 (Navajo Feb. 22,
1991) (holding that although the Navajo Nation owns all of the land on the reservation,
someone who builds an improvement has ownership rights in it such as the rights of sale
or other disposition, removal of the improvement, and denial of access to others); In re
Estate of Waunaka, 5 Navajo Rptr. 79, 81 (Navajo 1986) (holding that a Navajo has a
possessory use interest in the land within her ancestors' customary use area); In re Estate
of Apachee, 4 Navajo Rptr. 178, 181-82 (Navajo D. Ct. 1983) (Tso, J.) (dividing personal
property into productive and nonproductive goods for purposes of inheritance).
303. Then-District Court Judge Tso quoted from Blackstone's Commentaries in de-
scribing the transformation:
When I call these parts of our law leges non Scriptae [unwritten law], I
would not be understood as if all those laws were at present merely oral,
or communicated from the former ages to the present solely by word of
mouth ... But, with us at present, the monuments and evidences of our
legal customs are contained in the records of the several courts of justice in
books of reports and judicial decisions, and in the [treatises] of learned
sages of the profession, preserved and handed down to us from the times
of highest antiquity. However, I therefore style these parts of our law leges
non scriptae, because their original institution and authority are not set down
in writing, as acts of parliament are, but they receive their binding power,
and the force of laws, by long and immemorial usage, and their universal
reception throughout the kingdom.
In re Estate of Apachee, 4 Navajo Rptr. 178, 180 (Navajo D. Ct. 1983) (quoting I
Wummi BLAcKSoN'Oa, CommaiNA s 63) (St. George Tucker ed., 1803).
304. DaoaA & LYrE, supra note 230, at 136-37.
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The glaring exception is the field of transactional, or promissory,
law. None of the reported decisions expressly relies on Navajo custom.
Even when rejecting a doctrine of Anglo-American transactional law,
the courts have not referred to Navajo traditions, but to current
socioeconomic conditions 05
According to the Navajo Supreme Court justices, if the Navajo
courts applied traditional Navajo concepts in interpreting contracts,
businesspeople would be less willing to lend to individuals or to do
business in the Navajo NationA°6 The reservation might be "red-
lined." 3 0 The legal rules in other areas do not pose an equivalent
danger. For example, Anglo-American merchants do not care whether
the Navajos' family law originates in Anglo-American or traditional
Navajo concepts. 08
The Navajo justices thus have adopted rules of Anglo-American
transactional law in large part to achieve certain practical goals. Gen-
erally, nontraditional societies use law as an instrument of social
changeA°9 Considering the Navajos' practical orientation, their instru-
mental use of law is unsurprising.
A second reason for the adoption of Anglo-American transactional
law is that attorneys and advocates have not attempted to assert
traditional Navajo promissory law as the basis for a transactional
claim or defense, at least in any case before the present justices. 10 A
party intending to base a claim or defense on a custom not yet
305. See Russell v. Donaldson, 3 Navajo Rptr. 209 (Navajo D. Ct. 1982) (Tso, J.)
(interpreting resolution forbidding self-help repossession broadly because Navajo customers
frequently are abused, "and the elimination of self-help repossession was an enlightened
measure for the protection of the Navajo People"); Hawthorne v. Wener, 2 Navajo Rptr.
62 (Navajo D. Ct. 1979) (rejecting Statute of Frauds because it would work a great
hardship on people unaware of legal formalities and because of confusion in applying
Statute of Frauds provisions of the three different states in which the reservation is
located).
306. Interview with Justices (Austin), supra note 66.
307. According to one attorney, the fear has substance. After several judicial decisions
during the mid-1970s frustrated mobile home merchants in their efforts to repossess homes
from defaulting Navajo consumers, "the message got through, 'Aright, you can do it to
us but if you do it to us we're going to redline the reservation as far as financing is
concerned."' After that, creditors won several cases that they probably should have lost
because of violation of consumer protection statutes. Hynes Interview, supra note 17; see
also Jesse C. Trentadue, Tribal Court Jurisdiction over Collection Suits by Local Merchants
and Lenders: An Obstacle to Credit for Reservation Indians? 13 AM. INDAN L. Rv. 1,
44-46 (1987) (stating that lenders report reluctance to lend to Native Americans located in
North Dakota because of difficulty in obtaining repossession orders from tribal courts).
308. Interview with Justices (Austin), supra note 66. African legal scholars similarly
have concluded that their countries should adopt nontraditional concepts of transactional
law while adopting traditional customs in other areas as rules of law. KUcsA/, supra
note 20, at 115.
309. Trubek, supra note 21, at 4-6.
310. Interview with Justices (Austin), supra note 66.
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incorporated into Navajo common law must indicate that intention in
its pleadings.' Navajo promissory custom has not been raised as an
issue in a timely manner; therefore, no reported decision expressly
rejects such a custom in favor of a principle of Anglo-American
transactional law.
2. Extent of Adoption of Anglo-American Transactional Law
Although the Navajo courts and the Tribal Council have adopted
many elements of Anglo-American contract, commercial and consumer
law, they have rejected or modified several others. Still other significant
doctrines have not yet been addressed.
a) Contract law
The Navajo courts have adopted almost all of the basic doctrines
of Anglo-American contract law. Contract formation requires an offer
and acceptance and consideration.1 2 A contract, otherwise valid, may
be unenforceable because of mistake or misunderstanding between the
parties31 or because of abuse in the bargaining process, such as fraud
or unconscionable conduct. 314 Probably because of the jurists' desire
to reassure Anglo-American merchants of the enforceability of the
obligations of Navajo consumers, however, at most one reported
311. See Apache v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 3 Navajo Rptr. 250, 251 (Navajo
D. Ct. 1982) (Tso, J.).
312. See Amigo Chevrolet, Inc. v. Lee, No. A-CV-32-87, slip op. at 6-7 (Navajo Aug.
4, 1988) (recounting how Navajo couple received no consideration for releasing claims
against car dealership which wrongfully repossessed their car, when dealership agreed not
to accelerate obligations several months after release was executed); Michael Nelson &
Assocs., Inc. v. DCI Shopping Center, Inc., 5 Navajo Rptr. 52, 53-54 (Navajo 1985)
(letter from sublessee, MNA, to sublessor, DCI) (stating that lease would be terminated
upon receipt and letter from sublessor to sublessee accepting the offer to terminate
constituted an agreement to terminate effective on the date of the sublessor's letter, and
both sides gave consideration by relinquishing rights under the sublease).
In fact, in Michael Nelson and Assocs., the court silently adopted two of the esoteric
components of the offer and acceptance doctrine to reach its result. The sublessee, MNA,
had sent the initial letter to DCI on December 26, 1980. On January 8, 1981, MNA sent
another letter to DCI stating that it wished to continue the sublease. DCI received the
second letter on January 12, but earlier that day, it had mailed its letter accepting the
termination. Id. at 53. In order to hold that DCI's January 12 letter constituted a binding
acceptance, the court must have put together two doctrines: the mailbox rule that an
acceptance is valid upon posting, and the doctrine that the revocation of an offer is
ineffective until actually communicated to the offeree. See R.TATEmT (SEcoND) OF
CONTRACTs §§ 42, 63(a) (1981).
313. See Hood v. Bordy, No. A-CV-07-90, slip op. at 7-8, 9-17 (Navajo Feb. 22,
1991) (holding that if sellers intended to convey an interest in an apartment by bill of sale
rather than by deed, as buyers contend, the agreement would be unenforceable because
there was no "meeting of the minds"; even if both parties intended the conveyance to be
by bill of sale, the agreement would be unenforceable because of mutual mistake when
the sellers had no legal interest to convey).
314. See Amigo Chevrolet, Inc. v. Lee, No. A-CV-32-87, slip op. at 7 (Navajo Aug.
4, 1988) (dictum) (fraud); Tome v. Navajo Nation, 4 Navajo Rptr. 159 (Navajo D. Ct.
1983) (dictum) (unconscionability).
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decision excuses consumers from their obligations based on abuse of
the bargaining process.315 The lack of decisions indicates reluctance to
excuse Navajo consumers based on bargaining abuses, because mer-
chants regularly have taken advantage of Navajos' lack of sophisti-
cation in the Anglo-American world.3 16
Navajo contract interpretation also follows many of the rules of
Anglo-American law. The courts generally start with the words of the
contract .3 7 Those words are construed against the drafter, especially
when a form contract is involved.318
Navajo courts have applied various Anglo-American doctrines con-
cerning allocations of risk, sometimes expressly, other times without
reference to the doctrines by name. They have held that a promisor
does not have an obligation to perform when an express condition fails
to occur '19 or when the promisee violates a constructive condition. 30
315. The only decision that arguably relieves a Navajo consumer from a contract
because of bargaining abuse is Amigo Chevrolet, Inc. v. Lee, No. A-CV-32-87 (Navajo
Aug. 4, 1988). In that case, a car dealership repossessed a car purchased by the Lees for
payment default without a prior court order or the signed written consent of the debtors
in violation of the Navajo Tribal Code. Perhaps realizing its mistake, Amigo Chevrolet
allowed the husband to reclaim the vehicle, but required him to sign a document releasing
the merchant "from any and all claims arising out of the repossession." Id., slip op. at
2-3. The supreme court held that a consumer could release claims arising under the
repossession laws, but that the courts would scrutinize any release closely "to insure that
the agreements were made openly and fairly." Id., slip op. at 3. Where the "ambigu-
ousily]" worded document did not mention the repossession laws and there was no
indication that Lee intended to settle any claim arising under them, or even was aware
that he had such a claim, the release could not pass such scrutiny. Id., slip op. at 6-7.
Somewhat mitigating the power of the holding, however, the release was ineffective on
other grounds, such as lack of consideration, id., and Amigo Chevrolet's failure to obtain
the wife's agreement.
316. See 1 Vicme, supra note 89, at 9-17, 21-23 (describing various methods merchants
use to deceive Navajo consumers).
317. See, e.g., Wilson v. Begay, No. A-CV-05-86, slip op. at 9 (Navajo Mar. 8, 1988)
(holding that provision relieving rodeo operator of liability for injuries to "any contestant,
spectator, or help furnished by [the sponsoring organization]" does not relieve operator
of liability to a jewelry vendor who rented space from the sponsor); Navajo Hous. Auth.
v. Betsoi, 5 Navajo Rptr. 53 (Navajo 1985) (holding that housing agreements create
ownership rather than tenant relationships, based on their language and purposes).
318. See id. at 9; General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Becenti, 4 Navajo Rptr. 34, 36 (Navajo
1983).
319. See Howard Dana & Assocs. v. Navajo Hous. Auth., 1 Navajo Rptr. 325, 327-
28 (Navajo 1978) (applying express condition doctrine but not mentioning doctrine by
name).
320. See, e.g., Hall v. Arthur, 3 Navajo Rptr. 35, 40-41 (Navajo 1980) (holding that
sublessor may terminate sublease because of payment defaults of sublessee); Navajo Tribe
v. Jones, 5 Navajo Rptr. 235, 250-51 (Navajo D. Ct. 1986) (holding that obligations of
manager of arts and crafts trading post were terminated by actions of tribe in seizing the
vault of that store in which jewelry was stored).
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They have also excused performance because of impossibility. 2
Finally, Navajo damage rules should be familiar to Anglo-Americans.
Courts award damages, including consequential damages, to protect
expectations by trying to put the non-breaching party in the same
position that he or she would have occupied if the contract had been
performed.322 The non-breaching party has an obligation to mitigate
damages.32 Damages must be proved with reasonable certainty; math-
ematical precision is not required, but neither can the proof be overly
speculative.32
Few of the doctrines directly conflict with Navajo promissory cus-
toms.312 For example, although Navajos did not have a custom equivalent
to the consideration doctrine, they generally expected a return for a
promise or performance. Perhaps the most direct conflict concerns the
typical measure of damages: expectation or restitution.
Yet taken as a whole, Anglo-American promissory law and Navajo
promissory customs proceed from radically different assumptions about
the nature of transactions. Navajos traditionally evaluate contesting
parties in light of their overall relationship instead of focusing primarily
on the particular transaction, with the ultimate goal being restoration
of harmony among the parties and the community. Anglo-American
law gives priority to the discrete transaction and the individuals involved.
One stresses responsibility to the group, the other individual freedom.as
321. See Hood v. Bordy, No. A-CV-07-90, slip op. at 7-8 (Navajo Feb. 22, 1991)
(holding that when the sellers promised to convey an apartment by deed, buyers were
excused from obligation to pay purchase price because sellers did not have an ownership
interest to convey). The court actually misapplied the impossibility doctrine in this case.
See infra note 394 and accompanying text.
322. See Hall, 3 Navajo Rptr. at 38 (stating that goal is to protect expectations by
putting non-breaching party in the position that would have existed but for the breach);
Howard Dana & Assocs. v. Navajo Hous. Auth., I Navajo Rptr. 325, 326, 329 (Navajo
1978) (consequential damages awarded).
323. See Hall, 3 Navajo Rptr. at 38-39 (holding that sublessor cannot recover because
of failure to mitigate possible damage caused by sublessee's breach of sublease).
324. See Wilson v. Begay, No. A-CV-05-86, slip op. at 10-14 (Navajo Mar. 8, 1988)
(overturning damages for lost profits awarded in tort case because of overly speculative
basis for calculations); Navajo Nation v. Jones, 5 Navajo Rptr. 235, 249-50 (Navajo D.
Ct. 1986) (awarding damages based on $11,000 of lost inventory when tribe could establish
only that lost inventory was worth between $10,000 and $12,000, because mathematical
precision was not required).
325. See supra notes 88-103 and accompanying text (discussing those customs).
326. See supra notes 113-14, 139-40 and accompanying text. Obviously, Anglo-Amer-
ican transactional law does not completely ignore the larger relationships that provide the
background for a particular transaction. The U.C.C., for example, provides for consid-
eration of course of dealing, course of performance and usage of trade in interpreting a
contract. U.C.C. §§ 1-205, 2-208 (1987). Those considerations, however, are secondary;
the primary focus is on the terms of the particular contract in dispute. See MAcNEM,
supra note 139, at 10 ("neoclassical contract law, such as that of Restatement (Second),
treats custom and other non-promissory exchange-projectors as 'only a ripple upon the
great sea of promise').
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Wholesale incorporation of Anglo-American contract law would mean
adoption of a new view concerning individual relationships.
Navajo courts, however, have not incorporated Anglo-American con-
tract law in all respects. The most obvious example is their treatment
of the Statute of Frauds.327 During the 1970s, the Navajo Court of
Appeals held that an oral will is valid under tribal custom when all of
the "immediate family" of the testator are present and agree.3  Relying
on the validity of oral wills and interpreting the Tribal Council's failure
to enact a Statute of Frauds as a purposeful decision not to require
contracts to be in writing, a Navajo district court held in Hawthorne
v. Wene. 29 that a contract for the conveyance of ownership of a house
need not be in writing.330
The holding in Hawthorne has been limited legislatively. The Tribal
Council adopted four articles of the Uniform Commercial Code in 1986,
including the Statute of Frauds provisions in sections 2-201 and 9-203.311
This legislative action blocks the application of Hawthorne to transac-
tions governed by articles two or nine. Arguably, the adoption of these
sections should undermine Hawthorne's reasoning more broadly. Nev-
ertheless, the Navajo Supreme Court has recently decided two cases
involving oral contracts that many Anglo-American courts would inter-
pret as falling within the scope of the version of the Statute of Frauds
adopted by their state legislatures, without analyzing whether the oral
nature of the agreements might invalidate them.332 This suggests that
Hawthorne remains good law except for transactions within the scope
of those two code sections.
Navajo courts do not adhere strictly to other doctrines of Anglo-
American contract law, even if they are not expressly rejected. For
example, although no reported decision addresses the validity of the
327. Many modem Anglo-American courts share the Navajo courts' hostility toward
the Statute of Frauds. See FARNswoRTE, supra note 102, ch. 6.
328. See In re Estate of Benally, 1 Navajo Rptr. 219 (Navajo 1978); In re Estate of
Lee, 1 Navajo Rptr. 27 (Navajo 1971). Subsequently, the Navajo Supreme Court reaffirmed
the validity of oral wills, but overruled Estate of Benally concerning the identity of the
members of the testator's immediate family. In re Estate of Thomas, No. A-CV-01-87
(Navajo Aug. 12, 1988).
329. 2 Navajo Rptr. 62 (Navajo D. Ct. 1979).
330. Id. at 65-66. The court stated that to require certain contracts to be written would
work a great hardship on the Navajos, who "are mostly unaware of legal formalities,"
and therefore would lead to increased litigation. Id. at 65. Moreover, if state Statutes of
Fraud were applied, lack of uniformity and confusion would ensue, because the statutes
of New Mexico, Arizona and Utah differ. Id. at 65-66.
331. Navajo U.C.C. §§ 2-201, 9-203 (1986). See infra notes 341-42 and accompanying
text (describing adoption of U.C.C.).
332. See Hood v. Bordy, No. A-CV-07-90 (Navajo Feb. 22, 1991) (agreement to convey
ownership interest in apartment); Sells v. Espil, No. A-CV-15-89 (Navajo Aug. 14, 1990)
(agreement to provide brokerage services concerning sale of real estate).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol18/iss1/2
NA VAJO DISPUTE RESOLUTION
parol evidence doctrine, in practice it is substantially diluted. 313 The
Navajo people's heritage instills hostility toward a doctrine that would
cut off testimony concerning oral discussions preceding or contempo-
raneous with the execution of a written contract. 334 Navajo culture places
great importance on oral speech, 335 and in traditional dispute resolution
everyone is allowed to speak.336 A traditional Navajo would give scant
attention to the printed terms on a form contract, such as an installment
purchase agreement. 337 Adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code,
however, may spark a change; the Tribal Council enacted section 2-
202's parol evidence rule verbatim.338
A potentially greater source of difference between contract law in
typical Navajo and Anglo-American courts comes from the interpretation
which Navajo jurists give to Anglo-American principles when applying
them to concrete factual situations. For example, although Navajo courts
have adopted the same general rules as Anglo-American courts, 339 any
determination of whether damages have been proved with "reasonable
certainty" involves substantial discretion. Given Navajos' practical out-
look and ambivalent attitudes toward accumulation of wealth, courts
probably will not look sympathetically at hypothetical estimates of lost
profits.34
In conclusion, virtually all of the contract law rules which the Navajo
courts have adopted are expressly grounded in principles of Anglo-
American contract law; none originate in traditional Navajo customs.
This orientation is unlikely to change, at least with respect to contracts
333. Lally Interview, supra note 13 (stating that evidence that would run afoul of the
parol evidence rule is admitted, but judges tend to give the written contract substantially
more weight).
334. See supra notes 251-59 and accompanying text (discussing impact of Navajo
beliefs on Navajo jurists).
335. Navajo deities "thought the world into existence." Those thoughts were not
realized, however, "until they were spoken in prayer or sung in song." WrrMmsPooN,
supra note 38, at 15-16, 31. Words "are things of power." KLUCKHOHN & LmoHroN,
supra note 10, at 260.
336. See supra text accompanying note 66.
337. Interview with Justices (Tso), supra note 66. Inattention to the terms of a written
form contract, of course, is not limited to Navajo consumers. See KARL L.EwELLYN, THE
CoMaoN LAw TPaDrMoN: DEcmNo APrasis 370-71 (1960) (stating that customers do not
"assent" to all the terms in a form consumer purchase contract, but only to "the few
dickered terms, ... the broad type of the transaction, and ... any not unreasonable or
indecent terms the seller may have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the
reasonable meaning of the dickered terms").
338. Navajo U.C.C. § 2-202 (1986).
339. See supra notes 322-24 and accompanying text.
340. Interview with Justices (Austin), supra note 66; see Wilson v. Begay, No. A-CV-
05-86, slip op. at 12-14 (Navajo Mar. 8, 1988) (reversing award of consequential damages
from tort injury and remanding with instructions about the evidence which injured party
must proffer to prove damage to business and lost profits).
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in which one of the parties is not Navajo, as long as Navajos must do
substantial business with off-reservation merchants. Yet those principles
allow substantial room for interpretation. The beliefs and culture of the
jurists will influence the application of the Anglo-American contract
principles which they have adopted.
b) Commercial Law
After several years of meetings and revisions of drafts, the Tribal
Council adopted versions of articles one, two, three, and nine34' of the
Uniform Commercial Code in 1986. The council sought to encourage
business on the reservation and loans secured by property located or to
be located in the Navajo Nation by providing the certainty of statutory
rules familiar to off-reservation businesspeople, the same motivation
which prompted the courts to adopt Anglo-American common law
contract doctrines.342
The drafters of the Navajo code revised many sections of the official
version of the code to make it suitable for the tribe. Several of the
revisions were designed to avoid imposing duties on unsuspecting Nav-
ajos. The Navajo code provides that it does not apply to any "exclusively
barter transaction in which the aggregate market value of all goods and
services does not exceed $10,000" so that those transactions "shall be
governed by the customs and usages of the Navajo Tribe";3 43 defines
"merchants" to exclude artists so that artists will not have any of the
duties of merchants under the code;34 and removes any implied warranty
given by a seller of a farm animal that the animal is free of sickness
or disease,- unless the seller has prior knowledge that the animal is sick
or disabled.3 45
The courts have yet to see an impact from the adoption of the Navajo
Commercial Code. No reported decision applies it, and the justices of
the Navajo Supreme Court are unaware of any case in which a party
has raised it as a basis for a claim or defense.346
The lack of litigation can be explained. The, Navajo Code adopts the
provision in the uniform code in providing that where a transaction
341. Although the tribe adopted article 9, it has not instituted a system for filing
financing statements. Battles Interview, supra note 245.
342. &?e Navajo U.C.C. § 9-313 (1986) (official comment changes) ("The general
policy of the Navajo Nation is to encourage commercial transactions and to enable Navajo
debtors to maximize their credit worthiness by maximizing the business property which
they can use as collateral"); NAvAJo Tnms TODAY, Oct. 3, 1985, at 2, col. 2 (according
to the tribe's Small Business Administration director, "A Navajo UCC will help to
financially protect the Navajo business people and commercial banks, it'll get business
loans and it'll teach Navajos to live up to their financial responsibilities").
343. Navajo U.C.C. § 1-110 (1986).
344. Id. § 2-104(l).
345. Id. § 2-316(3)(d).
346. Interview with Justices, supra note 66.
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bears a reasonable relation to the Navajo Nation and a state, the parties'
election of one jurisdiction's substantive law shall govern. 347 The form
contracts used by off-reservation merchants probably provide that the
laws of the state in which the merchants are located control. If that
assumption is correct, any litigation in the Navajo courts arising out of
an alleged breach of those contracts will be governed by the state's
version of the Uniform Commercial Code, not the Navajo Nation's.
Because few merchants are located on the reservation, few disputes
between merchants and consumers will be governed by the Navajo
Commercial Code.
Moreover, even if Navajos' rights under the Navajo Uniform Com-
mercial Code are breached, they are unlikely to sue. For example, no
reported decision of a Navajo court addresses allegations that a product
was defective in breach of an express or implied warranty. Products
sold to Navajos undoubtedly have as many defects as those sold to
Anglo-Americans, but many tribal members are unaware of their rights,M
and even if they are aware, they shy away from litigation as expensive,
as necessitating the hiring of an attorney or advocate, and as involving
confrontation 49
Finally, if a contractual breach caused substantial injury to a Navajo
client, most attorneys who practice both in the Navajo courts and in
state courts would file the claim in state court. Attorneys believe that
they would probably draw a substantially wealthier jury in state court
and that wealthier juries give bigger awards.3 50
347. Navajo U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (1986).
348. Interview with Justices (Tso), supra note 65.
349. See I VicENin, supra note 89, at 39 (stating that injured Navajos often avoid
legal fights); Interview with Justices (Tso), supra note 66 (stating that Navajos avoid
litigation as expensive and as involving legal representation).
That Navajos have argued in several cases that merchants have violated contract or
consumer laws does not undercut the conclusion that Navajos avoid litigation. In each
case, the Navajos raised the violation as a defense to an action brought by a merchant
for repossession. See, e.g., Amigo Chevrolet, Inc. v. Lee, No. A-CV-32-87 (Navajo Aug.
4, 1988); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Becenti, 4 Navajo Rptr. 34 (Navajo 1983); Smoak
Chevrolet Co. v. Barton, 1 Navajo Rptr. 153 (Navajo 1977); A-I Mobile Homes, Inc. v.
Becenti, 2 Navajo Rptr. 21 (Navajo D. Ct. 1977).
350. See Hynes Interview, supra note 17 (stating that among other reasons, Navajo
claims are not tried on the reservation because "poor people sitting on juries don't give
very much money; to a person who doesn't have any money or very much money, a
hundred thousand dollars is a huge sum of money, more than they will ever see in their
lifetime"); Mason Interview, supra note 109.
Arizona and New Mexico courts assert jurisdiction over suits filed in state court against
non-reservation residents by Native Americans who reside on the reservation, at least when
the claim arose in part off the reservation. See Johnson v. Kerr-McGee Oil Indus., Inc.,
631 P.2d 548, 550 Ariz. App. (1981), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981); Paiz v.
Hughes, 417 P.2d 51, 52 (1966).
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The absence of litigation does not necessarily mean that the adoption
of the selected articles of the Uniform Commercial Code has had no
impact. It may have helped to attract business to the reservation or to
resolve disputes short of litigation. Regardless of the impact, if any,
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code stands as another testament
to the dine'e's attempts to use Anglo-American transactional law to
bring desired change to the reservation.
c) Consumer law
The field of consumer law obviously is of great importance to the
Navajo government. The Tribal Council created the tribal court system
partly to provide a forum for merchants to enforce their remedies upon
default by a consumer. 35' Most of the transactional disputes before the
courts involve actions upon consumer debt,32 and the courts have
adopted most of the principles of Anglo-American contract law largely
to assure merchants that collection is feasible. 353
Nevertheless, the Tribal Council has passed only one consumer pro-
tection resolution. It provides that personal property within the nation's
territoriad jurisdiction may not be repossessed except pursuant to court
order, unless the purchaser consents in writing at the time of reposses-
sion.3-4 Under this statute, self-help repossession to which the debtor
does not consent is impermissible. 311
Off-reservation merchants, used to the availability of self-help repos-
session,356 have complained of this requirement. 357 The prohibition serves
351. See supra notes 212-17 and accompanying text.
352. Martin Interview, supra note 201 (estimating that 90% of transactional law
disputes are consumer collection actions).
353. See supra notes 306-08 and accompanying text.
354. NAvAjo TaRm. CODE tit. 7, § 607 (1977 & Supp. 1984-85). Penalties for violations
are severe. A business whose employees willfully violate the provision may be prohibited
from doing business within the Navajo Nation's territorial jurisdiction, and whether or
not the violation is willful, the violator commits a crime with a minimum fine of $100.
Id. § 608. The violator also is liable to the purchaser for any damage caused by the
wrongful repossession, but not less than "the credit service charge plus 10% of the
principal amount of the debt or the time price differential plus 10% of the cash price."
Id. § 609. This is the same liability imposed by the U.C.C. for a secured creditor's
violation of a debtor's rights upon default if the collateral is consumer goods, U.C.C. §
9-507(l) (1987), but of course, self-help repossession is permissible under the U.C.C. Id.
§ 9-503.
355. See Russell v. Donaldson, 3 Navajo Rptr. 209, 211-14 (Navajo D. Ct. 1982) (Tso,
J.).
356. Both Arizona and New Mexico have passed consumer protection laws, but these
do not prohibit self-help repossession. See ARiz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 6-624 (Supp. 1990);
AmIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47-9503 (1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-9-503, 56-1-5(C) (1990);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-19-7(J) (Supp. 1990).
357. See Russell, 3 Navajo Rptr. at 213 ("[Mlany businesses whine about our repos-
session law and use every available means of blocking or frustrating it.").
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important functions, however. It permits the consumer to assert any
defenses, and to make alternative housing, transportation or other ar-
rangements, before the collateral is removed.3 58
Perhaps more important, the elimination of self-help repossession
gives the district court an opportunity to push for a settlement. In
general, Navajo judges strongly encourage settlements. 3 9 The tradition
of resolving disputes by agreement between the parties fuels this ten-
dency. In consumer collection actions, Navajo judges often have eco-
nomic leverage behind their efforts. If the value of the collateral is
insufficient to cover the debt, the merchant often cannot collect the
deficiency because many Navajos are judgment-proof360 The code does
not provide for garnishment, and exempts from execution any use rights
in land,36' up to seventy-five sheep units, and personal property with a
value of up to $5000.362 Judges frequently prod creditors facing a loss
by proceeding to judgment to agree to a settlement giving the consumer
additional time to make payments. 363
Navajo consumers have protections beyond the one provision in the
tribal code. Navajo courts must employ relevant federal statutory law;3"
in several actions, consumers have defended against repossessions, with
mixed success, by asserting violations of the federal Truth in Lending
Act.3 65 Moreover, Navajos also benefit from any additional protections
358. As then-Judge Tso stated:
Self-help repossession is an archaic legal provision. It permits sellers to
ride rough-shod over consumers and... use the holding of essential property
needed for daily life as a means of extorting money from the consumer.
True, repossession may be legally justified in most cases, but there is simply
no justification for not allowing the consumer to voice his grievances as
long as the doors of the courts are open to creditors. The Council minutes
repeat many instances of the abuse of Navajo consumers, and the elimination
of self-help repossession was an enlightened measure for the protection of
the Navajo People.
Id.
359. Interview with Justices (Bluehouse), supra note 66. One attorney advises his
Anglo-American clients of this tendency, and refuses to represent those clients on the
reservation if they consistently want to play "hard ball." Mason Interview, supra note
109.
360. Cadman Interview, supra note 63; Lally Interview, supra note 13. Lally believes
that permitting garnishment and reducing the amount of exempt property are the biggest
steps the tribe can take to increase the confidence of Anglo-American merchants in their
ability to collect, and will result in substantially improved credit terms for Navajos.
361. See Johnson v. Dixon, 4 Navajo Rptr. 108, 111-12 (Navajo 1983).
362. NAvAJo Tam. CODE tit 7, § 711 (Supp. 1984-85).
363. See Interview with Justices (Bluehouse), supra note 66; Mason Interview, supra
note 109.
364. See supra text accompanying note 297.
365. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1613, 1631-1641, 1671-1677 (1988). Compare Smoak Chevrolet
Co. v. Barton, 1 Navajo Rptr. 153 (Navajo 1977) (holding that although merchant violated
Truth in Lending Act by not advising consumer on front of contract of hidden interest
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afforded by the consumer protection statutes of the state in which they
enter the transaction. 36
Despite merchants' dissatisfaction with the lack of self-help reposses-
sion, the bottom line is that merchants continue to sell to Navajo
consumers and take back purchase money security interests in the goods,
and they continue to seek enforcement from the Navajo courts. Mer-
chants may decline to extend credit in some marginal cases and may
charge higher interest rates to Navajos because of the extra costs imposed
by compulsory resort to the courts.36 Overall, however, merchants must
believe that they can make money on transactions with tribal members.
The consumer law and the courts, therefore, have fulfilled an important
function for the tribe - facilitating business activity while protecting
against exploitation - albeit at a cost.
C. Traditional Promissory Customs in the Courts
Ideally, the norms by which most members of a society live are
consistent with that society's laws. 6s In intermediate societies, many
individuals cling to traditional norms, with the result that inconsistent
laws (often imported from nontraditional societies) are ignored.3 69 The
potential for such a conflict among the dine'j is obvious. The courts
have adopted foreign transactional laws, which conflict fundamentally
with traditional customs.370 When Navajo courts apply these rules of
law, they risk applying rules inconsistent with the customs followed by
many tribal members.
charge created by acceleration of debt, debtor's claim based on that violation is barred
by one-year federal statute of limitations) and A-i Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Becenti, 2
Navajo Rptr. 21 (Navajo D. Ct. 1979) (holding that consumer's counterclaim barred by
statute of limitations) with Manygoats v. General Motors Credit Corp., 4 Navajo Rptr.
34 (Navajo 1983) (following amended federal law, which permits counterclaims in the
form of setoffs beyond the one-year limitation period).
366. See General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Becenti, 4 Navajo Rptr. 34 (Navajo 1983)
(imposing penalties of New Mexico consumer protection statute because of creditor's
willful failure to fill in many of the blanks on the installment contract form).
367. See 1 HEARING, supra note 220, at 153 (testimony of attorney Robert Wilson)
(stating that car dealerships have taken into account the need to obtain a court order as
a cost of doing business; and raise their prices to Navajos accordingly; they do not
discontinue doing business, because Navajo consumer business is "extremely lucrative");
Lally Interview, supra note 13 (stating that merchants in border towns depend on Navajo
business; because of high default rates and collection difficulties, however, they charge
high rates of interest).
368. The attempt to eliminate alcohol consumption during the Prohibition period
provides an example of the problems which may arise when laws conflict with social
norms.
369. See KuacsAR, supra note 20, at 95-98.
370. See supra text accompanying note 326.
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Despite this risk, there are three reasons why Navajo courts should
continue to apply Anglo-American concepts of transactional law to
transactions involving a non-Navajo party or in which a merchant is
involved. First, those concepts evolved to regulate disputes arising from
discrete transactions, such as those between Navajo consumers and
merchants, and they work in resolving such disputes, whether or not
one of the parties is Navajo. 371 To the extent that some of the concepts
seem inappropriate, Navajo jurists may reject them expressly or interpret
them differently than would their Anglo-American counterparts. 372 Sec-
ond, imposition of Navajo promissory customs on non-Navajos, espe-
cially those who do not reside within the Navajo Nation, may impose
unfair burdens. 373 Third and most important, the Anglo-American mer-
chants, with whom the Navajos need to continue doing business, un-
doubtedly expect Anglo-American principles to control. 374
Use of Anglo-American law when a non-Navajo or a merchant is
involved, however, does not necessarily mean use of Anglo-American
law in all instances. Navajo transactional law need not be unitary;
Navajo courts could apply a different set of principles to promises
between two nonmerchant Navajos. These courts have several justifi-
cations for creating a dual system of law. They generally decline to
apply Navajo customs when one of the parties is a non-Navajo, 375 and
the traditional economy did not have merchant-consumer relationships,
arguably making the traditional customs inapplicable to transactions
involving merchants. 376 Moreover, the Navajo Commercial Code pro-
vides for traditional customs to govern traditional barter transactions,
and the uniform law to govern other sales of goods. 377 That provision
supports the principle that traditional transactions should be governed
by traditional customs.
The facts of reported decisions buttress the argument for a dual
system. In intratribal transactions, Navajos often seem unaware of
principles of Anglo-American law and of the normal practices of Anglo-
Americas in similar circumstances.
371. See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 327-40 and accompanying text.
373. An off-reservation merchant who uses standardized forms and engages in nu-
merous transactions each day cannot easily adopt different practices and forms for Navajo
and non-Navajo customers. Moreover, if the Navajo tribe imposed that obligation on
merchants, the neighboring Zuni, Ute and White Mountain Apache tribes might follow,
each with its own unique rules.
374. See supra notes 306-08 and accompanying text.
375. See Lente v. Notah, 3 Navajo Rptr. 72, 81 (Navajo 1982).
376. See supra notes 48-50, 85-87 and accompanying text (discussing traditional econ-
omy).
377. See supra text accompanying note 343.
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Consider Hawthorne v. Wener, the decision that rejected the Statute
of Frauds.378 On May 21, 1965, the Hawthornes became the assignees
of a homesite lease (the tribe was the lessor), but the Weners moved
into the house pursuant to an oral agreement with the Hawthornes, the
terms of which were in dispute. The Hawthomes alleged that they leased
the house to the Weners, in return for which the Weners were to make
all mortgage payments and assist in the building of the Hawthornes'
church. The Weners claimed that they purchased the house, and the
Hawtho:mes' sole role was to help them obtain the assignment of the
homesite. lease; instead, the Hawthornes wrongly became the assignees.379
The Weners lived in the house for the next eleven years, until the
Hawthornes sued to evict them and the Weners sued to enjoin distur-
bance of their possession. During that time, the Hawthornes made no
repairs, expended no money on the house, had no keys, and made no
inspections. The Weners made all mortgage payments, deducting the
interest on their income tax returns, while the Hawthornes did not report
the payments as income, which they should have done if the payments
were rent.3w
The district court barred the Hawthornes' claim because of laches,
and ruled for the Weners on the equities, awarding them sole possession
and ownership.38" ' The Hawthornes alleged that the Weners had first
breached the alleged lease in December 1972.82 Although the Haw-
thornes filed their action well within the applicable six-year statute of
limitations, their delay, according to the court, was detrimental to the
Weners, who continued to make payments in the belief that they were
purchasing the house.383
The court should not have based the decision on laches. Surely it
did not wish to create a rule in which a landlord must evict immediately
after a default or risk losing its right to terminate the lease if the tenant
continues, to make rental payments. Moreover, even if the Hawthornes
lost the right to terminate the alleged lease for the December 1972
default by allowing the Weners to continue in possession, the Haw-
thomes should have retained the right to terminate for any other reason,
including the expiration of the lease period. Finally, if the Weners
believed that the Hawthornes' sole role was to help them to obtain an
378. See supra notes 327-32 and accompanying text (discussing status of Statute of
Frauds in the Navajo courts).
379. Hawthorne v. Wener, 2 Navajo Rptr. 62, 62-63 (Navajo D. Ct. 1969).
380. Id. at 63, 67-68.
381. Id. at 66-67. The Weners' equities were superior, according to the court, because
they expended money in the belief that they were purchasing the house, while the
Hawthorne; would not be harmed by a judgment for the Weners because they had
expended no money on it. Id.
382. Id. at 64. The opinion does not specify the nature of the alleged breach.
383. Id. at 67.
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assignment of the homesite lease, they were just as guilty of laches in
not seeking to clear up title for eleven years.3
The mistake was in trying to apply Anglo-American concepts of law
or equity to these facts. If the parties had been raised in and governed
by Anglo-American traditions, they probably would have placed the
agreement into writing, eliminating subsequent questions about whether
they intended a lease or a purchase. If the Weners believed that they
were purchasing the property, they would have insisted on clear title
and would have received confirmation from the mortgagee that they
could assume the existing mortgage.
Instead, the parties' continuing relationship, which almost certainly
preexisted the 1965 agreement, seems to have governed their behavior.
In 1965, the Weners looked to the Hawthornes for help with the
government, the Hawthornes to the Weners for help in constructing
their church. For eleven years the parties apparently were satisfied with
their arrangements. Information about the total relationship before and
during the 1965-76 period, including the reasons why a dispute arose in
1976, would have helped in arriving at a result consistent with that
relationship. Granted, this information might be irrelevant if the agree-
ment and the breach were considered as a discrete transaction, but the
parties almost certainly viewed the agreement as part of a larger whole.
Moreover, a relevant Navajo custom existed. Traditionally, a family
acquires use rights in land by living on it; upon abandonment, another
family can settle on it and acquire possessory rights." 5 Although this
custom should not have been dispositive in Hawthorne because leases
now exist among the Navajos, the Weners' occupancy of the property
could have created a presumption for them.
The advantage of Navajo promissory law, however, diminishes when
the parties to an agreement do not have a significant ongoing relation-
384. Navajos often seem to put off filing a lawsuit. See Hall v. Arthur, 3 Navajo
Rptr. 35 (Navajo 1980) (stating that Navajo sublessors and non-Navajo sublessees entered
into written three-year commercial sublease on October 1, 1972 and another on February
11, 1977; although sublessees apparently also possessed the premises between October 1975
and February 1977 and although sublessees made only some of the payments required,
Navajo sublessors did not file action until May 1979); Washburn v. McKensley, 1 Navajo
Rptr. 114 (Navajo 1977) (stating that although three-year sublease of irrigated land from
McKensley to Washburn expired or was terminated in 1973, Washburn continued in
possession of land for several more years, and court refused to award damages for the
post-termination period because they were in pari delicto as to the confused state of title).
See also supra notes 348-50 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for relative absence
of commercial lawsuits by Navajos).
385. See KIucKon & LEiGirroN, supra note 10, at 106-07; 1 Van Valkenburgh,
supra note 59, at 20-21. The Weners, however, could not have obtained customary use
rights in the home vis-a-vis the Hawthornes, because only those who construct an im-
provement can acquire rights by customary use. Hood v. Bordy, No. A-CV-07-90, slip
op. at 15 (Navajo Feb. 22, 1991).
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ship. In those cases, the individual facts and circumstances should
indicate whether Navajo or Anglo-American concepts are more suitable.
Hood v. Bordy,5 6 the most recent Navajo Supreme Court decision
concerning a promissory dispute, involves facts making the value of
traditional Navajo promissory law more problematic. The parties had
only an incidental relationship outside the contract in dispute. They
lived in the same village (with about 100 families) within the same
chapter. They knew each other because of this geographical proximity,
but had no dealings apart from the contract.3' Moreover, the contractual
performance also did not create a long-term continuing relationship, as
described below.
The Floods occupied one apartment in a fifteen-to-twenty-unit build-
ing constructed as army housing during World War II and owned by
the Navajo Nation in fee simple. The tribe had condemned the building
long before the occurrence of the events at issue in the case. It did not
manage the property, have leasehold arrangements with, or demand
rents of occupants, who were in effect squatters.3 88
In 1981, the Hoods purchased their apartment from the previous
occupant for $2,500, and in 1987, the Bordys orally contracted to
purchase it from the Hoods for the same price and made a $900 down
payment. The Bordys did not realize that the Navajo Nation owned the
property and that the Hoods had no ownership or possessory interest
to convey to them.3 9 Indeed, the Hoods probably thought that they
owned a .transferrable property interest.90
386. Hood v. Bordy, No. A-CV-07-90, slip op. at 15 (Navajo Feb. 22, 1991).
387. Lally Interview, supra note 13. Attorney Lally represented the Bordys in the
lawsuit.
388. Bordy, No. A-CV-07-90, slip op. at 2-3; Lally Interview, supra note 13.
389. Bordy, No. A-CV-07-90, slip op. at 2-3; Lally Interview, supra note 13. During
the litigation, the Hoods claimed that they told the Bordys that they 'did not hold title
and would provide them with a bill of sale; the Bordys contended that they had not been
told that the Hoods lacked title and were expecting title to be conveyed. The trial court
believed the Bordys' version of events. Bordy, No. A-CV-07-90, slip op. at 3-4. The
Bordys' attorney says that his clients did not really understand the difference between a
bill of sale and a deed (deeds are not used on the reservation, which the United States
owns in trust for the tribe, or to convey off-reservation allotments which are owned by
the United States in trust for the allottees), but they did expect a document conveying
them permanent ownership rights. Lally Interview, supra note 13.
390. At trial, the Hoods argued that such interest arose by customary use ownership.
Bordy, No. A-CV-07-90, slip op. at 9. Customary use is a valid method of acquiring
ownership of improvements, which are privately owned even though the land is owned
for the benefit of the Navajo Nation. Id., slip op. at 12-14; cf. Navajo U.C.C. § 9-313
(1986) (stating that a fixture remains personal property as long as its value exceeds the
cost of repairing the damage to real property caused by its removal). The Navajo Supreme
Court concluded, however, that an individual could acquire a customary use right in an
improvement only by constructing it or being in the line of transfer from the original
builder. Bordy, No. A-CV-07-90, slip op. at 12, 14-15. The Hoods could not satisfy either
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After paying the Hoods an additional $350 pursuant to the oral
contract, the Bordys discovered that the property was owned by the
tribe and that the Hoods could not convey title. They continued to
occupy the apartment but informed the Hoods that they would make
no more payments. The Hoods eventually sued, asking the court to
restore the apartment to them and compel the Bordys to pay rent for
the period after their notice of cancellation of the purchase contract.391
The trial court ruled for the Bordys, refusing to order them to vacate
and instead ordering the Hoods to restore the $1,250 already paid.392
The Navajo Supreme Court affirmed, relying on several different Anglo-
American contract doctrines (some of which it mislabeled). 393 If the
agreement was for conveyance of title, as the district court found, the
Hoods could not enforce the Bordys' promise to pay because of the
Hoods' own inability to perform their promise to transfer title.394 If the
Hoods intended to convey something less, as they testified, then there
was no "meeting of the minds, ' ' 3s or in the parlance of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, a misunderstanding existed in which neither party
knew or had reason to know of the meaning attached by the other.39
Finally, the court stated, any agreement "to sell the condemned property
of the Navajo Nation also is void as against public policy. ' '397
Although the major reason for using Navajo customs - the predom-
inance of the total relationship over the individual transaction in the
requirement. Id., slip op. at 15.
When the Hoods had purchased the apartment and then sold it to the Bordys, however,
they probably did not think that their ownership rested on customary use rights. They
seem to have been as naive about title matters as the Bordys. Lally Interview, supra note
13.
391. Bordy, No. A-CV-07-90, slip op. at 3-4; Lally Interview, supra note 13.
392. Bordy, No. A-CV-07-90, slip op. at 4-5. The Hoods, however, appear judgment-
proof, making the restitutionary award valueless to the Bordys. Lally Interview, supra
note 13.
393. Bordy, No. A-CV-07-90, slip op. at 7-8.
394. The Navajo Supreme Court stated that the contract was unenforceable by the
Hoods because their inability to convey title created a lack of consideration, and because
their promise to convey title was impossible to perform. At least under modem contract
doctrine as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the court misused those
concepts. The Bordys received consideration for their promise to pay: the Hoods' promise
to convey title. See RSTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF Co rEAcTs § 71 (1986). Impossibility, or
as it is now generally termed impracticability, is used as a shield by the promisor, not as
a sword by the promisee. Id. § 266(1).
The better analysis under Restatement principles would be either that the Hoods failed to
provide adequate assurance that they could perform, amounting to an anticipatory repu-
diation justifying the Bordys' refusal to perform, id. §§ 251, 253(2), or that the Bordys'
principal purpose was substantially frustrated, id. § 266(2).
395. Bordy, No. A-CV-07-90, slip op. at 7-8.
396. RsTATEmENT (SEcoND) oF CoNTRAcrs § 20(1)(a) (1981).
397. Bordy, No. A-CV-07-90, slip op. at 8.
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minds of the parties - is absent in Hood v. Bordy, use of Anglo-
American principles also is problematic. Clearly, the parties no more
attempted to govern their behavior according to Anglo-American law
and practices than did the parties in Hawthorne v. Wener. Neither party
did any type of checking as to title before entering the transaction, even
though the low purchase price or the markings on various appliances
that they were the property of the Navajo Nation presumably should
have alerted them to check the title. Under similar facts, an Anglo-
American court might have concluded that, when the purchasers did
not use ordinary care to protect themselves, they assumed the risk of a
title defect. 98 When Navajos lack strong communal ties with each other
and also do not understand Anglo-American transactional law and
practices, neither Anglo-American laws nor traditional Navajo customs
are likely to produce a completely satisfactory resolution. The court
should use the system that seems to fit best under the facts of the
particular case.
VII. Summary and Conclusion
For the past sixty years, wrenching political and economic changes
have disrupted the dine'i's traditional way of life. These changes have
left the dine'd with a strong central government but an economy which
cannot support the tribal members or provide them with desired goods
and services.
As a response to some of those economic and political changes, the
tribal government has created a court system which looks in many
respects like Anglo-American court systems. The political branches and
the courts have adopted many of the rules of Anglo-American trans-
actional law in an effort to encourage non-Navajos to do business with -
Navajos. They have been partly successful: off-reservation merchants
are willing to sell to Navajos and enforce their contracts in the Navajo
courts; on-reservation business, however, continues to lag for reasons
outside the control of the courts.
Although adjudicated dispute resolution radically departs from tra-
ditional resolution by mediation, Navajos have accepted and approve
of their court system to a remarkable degree. People's approval of the
courts, however, does not necessarily mean that they have adopted and
assimilated all of the laws which the courts apply.
So far, the use of Anglo-American transactional law apparently has
not altered the norms by which many Navajos govern their own trans-
398. A court might also have concluded that the Hoods were entitled to retain some
of the Bordys' payment under a quasi-contractual theory. The Bordys had received
something of value. The Hoods conveyed occupancy rights recognized by other members
of the village, even if not by the tribal government, and the Bordys had possessed the
apartment for several years at the time of the trial without challenge from the government.
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actions. To try to reach decisions that more accurately conform with
the parties' understandings, the courts could create a dual system of
transactional law: Anglo-American when at least one non-Navajo or a
merchant is involved; Navajo in most other instances.
Greater sensitivities to the parties' understandings, however, does not
necessarily mean a better system of law. Use of Anglo-American rules
of transactional law in all instances may bring more rapid acceptance
among the dine'd of values and norms conducive to continuing economic
development in the Navajo Nation. If law can have this type of "forc-
ing" effect among any people, the Navajos are prime candidates, given
their demonstrated skill at selectively incorporating elements of foreign
culture. The many studies that have been conducted of other intermediate
societies, however, do not resolve whether legislative or judicial adoption
of foreign law can have this type of impact. The outcome among the
dine'd remains uncertain.
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